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INTRODUCTION 
The idea that contracts give legal force to a “meeting of the minds,” or a 
bargained-for exchange between two parties, is an old concept in contract 
law.1 Enforcement of a contract that satisfies this “meeting of the minds” 
furthers welfare maximization and individual autonomy by reinforcing a 
promise that both parties believed would make them better off. But in many 
modern contracts—especially those between businesses and consumers—a 
meeting of the minds never occurs. Rather, consumers almost never bargain 
for the terms. And often, they do not even know what the terms are. With 
respect to these “contracts of adhesion,”2 it is not clear that the standard 
justification for contract enforcement exists.  
Indeed, the common law does not require a meeting of the minds for a 
contract to exist. Long ago, the common law abandoned that element in favor 
of a requirement of objective manifestation of assent3—today, a signature on 
the line or click of the box constitutes valid acceptance, regardless of the 
consumer’s ignorance of, or opposition to, the terms of the contract. Moreover, 
once a consumer has assented to the contract, evidence about what she thought 
the contract contained is barred under the parol evidence rule, which requires 
courts to interpret contracts according to their clearly written terms, excluding 
evidence of negotiations or expectations of the parties.4 As a result, with the 
law’s endorsement, contracts of adhesion have proliferated.  
Today, contracts of adhesion govern almost every major financial 
undertaking, like securing a loan, using purchased software, obtaining 
insurance, renting a car, having a cell phone, going on a cruise, banking 
online, and accepting employment. 5  Typically, such contracts require 
arbitration of disputes, mandate confidentiality with respect to the results of 
 
1 See E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 943-44 (1967) 
(describing the origins of the “meeting of the minds” doctrine); see also Richard L. Barnes, 
Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 139 (2005) 
(explaining that by the mid-nineteenth century, contract law abandoned a subjective theory of 
acceptance in favor of one based on objective manifestation of assent). 
2 See Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 143 (1970) (explaining that 
such contracts do not involve the haggling or cooperative drafting of typical contracts, their creation 
being “rather of a fly and flypaper” (footnote omitted)). 
3 See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6 (3d ed. 2004) (“By 
the end of the nineteenth century, the objective theory had become ascendant and courts universally 
accept it today.”). 
4 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 7.3, at 226.  
5 See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/ 
arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [http://perma.cc/JQ9M-VUXY] (discussing 
the prevalence of arbitration provisions in consumer and employment contracts). 
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the arbitration, waive the consumer’s right to participate in a class action 
lawsuit, provide a shorter limitations period in which to file suit, choose a 
forum for any ensuing litigation, and assign all court costs to the consumer.6 
The contracts may also limit the company’s liability and give unilateral 
modification rights to the business.7  Reading and understanding these 
contracts would require significant time and legal training. Consumers thus 
often choose not to read them, leaving themselves at the mercy of businesses 
with respect to the legal rights that govern their daily economic transactions.  
Some courts searched for a way to rein in contracts of adhesion, perceiving 
them to be an abuse of contract law, ultimately landing on the doctrine of 
unconscionability. 8  Unconscionability was an arcane, nebulous concept in 
contract law that courts had used to avoid enforcing contracts that “shock the 
conscience.”9  The doctrine seeks “the prevention of oppression and unfair 
surprise” and directs against the “disturbance of allocation of risks because of 
superior bargaining power.”10 The distinctive element of the unconscionability 
defense, as opposed to fraud or duress, is its two-pronged analysis: traditionally, 
a provision must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable to be 
held unenforceable.11 Procedural unconscionability “arises out of defects in the 
process by which the contract was formed, and can include a variety of 
inadequacies, such as age, literacy, lack of sophistication, hidden or unduly 
complex contract terms, bargaining tactics, and the particular setting existing 
during the contract formation process.” 12  Substantive unconscionability 
“suggests the exchange of obligations so one-sided as to shock the court’s 
conscience.”13 If a court finds that a provision is substantively unconscionable, 
 
6 See FAIR CONTRACTS, http://www.faircontracts.org [http://perma.cc/6BRC-SET3] (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2015) (listing and explaining, for the purpose of consumer education, the types of 
provisions frequently found in contracts of adhesion).  
7  Liquidated Damages Clause, FAIR CONTRACTS, http://www.faircontracts.org/contract-
provisions/liquidated-damages-clause [http://perma.cc/68VH-L3VZ] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015); 
Universal Modification, FAIR CONTRACTS, http://www.faircontracts.org/contract-provisions/ 
unilateral-modification [http://perma.cc/M88H-EMFF] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
8 See infra Section I.A.  
9 See Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 93 A.3d 760, 767 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). 
10 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014); see also Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—
The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 8 (2012) (explaining that the 
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intentionally left it to courts to define unconscionability). 
11 Lonegrass, supra note 10, at 11; see also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The 
Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (coining the terms “procedural 
unconscionability” and “substantive unconscionability”). 
12 Rodriguez, 93 A.3d at 767 (citation omitted).  
13  Id. (citation omitted). For one of the earliest American cases citing the “shocks the 
conscience” standard, see In re Downham Co., 165 A. 152, 153 (Del. Super. Ct. 1932) (“Inadequacy of 
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it can void the specific provision and leave the rest of the contract intact.14 
Using unconscionability, it is possible for courts to step in and prevent the 
enforcement of a variety of contract provisions. 
Most courts do not find contracts of adhesion to be unconscionable per se, 
though they typically consider the lack of bargaining power and inability to 
choose, negotiate, or understand terms as indications of procedural 
unconscionability.15 A minority of courts find that adhesiveness alone—a low 
likelihood that a consumer read, understood, or negotiated the contract—can 
establish procedural unconscionability. 16  In general, however, contracts of 
adhesion are enforceable unless the substantive terms are also unconscionable.17  
Courts and scholars alike fear the ambiguity of the doctrine, worrying that it 
lacks predictability and consistency, and that liberal use could swallow all of 
contract law.18 They recognize the need for a structure—for unconscionability to 
act as a true legal concept with clearly defined edges that prevent it from bleeding 
into every case. This raises the question: what would unconscionability need in 
order to be a legal concept? And does it already qualify?  
A legal concept is “an abstract set of legal categories that 
. . . subordinate[s] particular legal relationships to a general system of 
classification.”19 Without a concept, it would be difficult if not impossible for 
 
price when not sufficiently great to shock the sense of the Court, yet coupled with circumstances 
tending to show a sacrifice of the property at the sale, is always considered.”).  
14 U.C.C. § 2-302(1).  
15 See Lonegrass, supra note 10, at 9-10 (providing factors considered to determine whether a 
contract is procedurally unconscionable). 
16 See, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 572 (Cal. 2007) (“The procedural element 
of an unconscionable contract generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion, which, imposed 
and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the 
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.” (citation omitted)); Kelker v. Geneva-Roth 
Ventures, 2013 MT 62, ¶ 29, 369 Mont. 254, 303 P.3d 777 (“A contract is unconscionable if it is a 
contract of adhesion and the contractual terms unreasonably favor the drafter.” (citation omitted)); 
State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 27, 329 P.3d 658 (N.M. 2014) (“[A]n 
adhesion contract is procedurally unconscionable and unenforceable when the terms are patently 
unfair to the weaker party.” (citation omitted)).  
17 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 4.28, at 585 (“Courts have resisted applying the doctrine 
where there is only procedural unconscionability without substantive unfairness.” (footnote 
omitted)). But see Lonegrass, supra note 10, at 16-17 (describing courts’ relaxation of the requirements 
for the substantive prong when the procedural prong is met).  
18 See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An 
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1085 (2006) (“One of the major 
criticisms leveled at the doctrine of unconscionability, as expressed in section 2-302, is that it fails 
to prescribe meaningful content, namely a workable definition of unconscionability.”); Leff, supra 
note 11, at 491 (noting that “[o]ne of the central problems” with unconscionability is that it fails to 
answer the question, “what, if anything, will insulate a contract from [it]?”). By “doctrine” here I 
mean courts’ use of the concept.  
19 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960, at 14 (1992).  
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a judge to rule consistently on a case involving the same legal issue as a prior 
case but a different factual situation.20 For example, if there is precedent that 
a contract is unconscionable because it required a consumer to file her claim 
in California despite only having contacts in New York, how is a judge in a 
subsequent case to know whether a contract requiring a consumer to file within 
sixty days is similarly unconscionable? Does the concept of unconscionability 
encompass the former, but not the latter? In order to know, one must clearly 
define what the concept means. In this way, concepts connect particular factual 
scenarios together—they order our thinking, abstracted from particular 
instances. This ability to categorize is the first element of a legal concept. 
The second element of a legal concept is that it serves as a rational basis 
for normative decisions. A legal concept, unlike, say, a literary concept, must 
do more than simply classify. It becomes “a normative force that provides a 
reason for action or decision.”21 Because judges use classifications as the bases 
for judgments, the classification must rationally connect to a rule. 
Classification and normativity are the hallmarks of a legal concept.22 
These two elements also suggest two meanings at work behind legal 
concepts: jural meaning and normative meaning. As Shyamkrishna Balganesh 
and Gideon Parchomovsky explain, the jural meaning is the “structural core” 
of the concept, or its rule-like character.23 However, this meaning is often 
open-textured, or indeterminate. To apply a concept, judges employ the 
normative meaning that accompanies it.24 A useful example in tort law is the 
duty of care. The jural meaning of the duty of care is that an individual has 
an obligation to avoid causing significant harm. The normative meaning is 
debated, but one commonly put forth is that the cheapest cost avoider should 
bear the duty.25 Another normative meaning is that the duty of care is based 
on “basic moral principles.”26 Balganesh and Parchomovsky argue that the 
 
20 See Leff, supra note 2, at 135 (“[C]lassification is a powerful intellectual device for efficiently 
identifying nonidentical things and concepts which may for certain purposes be treated identically.”). 
21 Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 535 (1988).  
22 See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 11 (1984) (“When a new 
case arose to which no existing rule applied, it could be categorized and the correct rule for it could 
be inferred by use of the general concepts and principles; the rule could then be applied to the facts 
to dictate the unique correct decision in the case.”). 
23 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the Common 
Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (2015) (discussing how jural meaning forms the core of common 
law concepts).  
24 See id. (explaining how the “normative meaning does not displace the jural meaning,” but 
rather “works in tandem with” the jural meaning). 
25 Id. at 1245. 
26 Id.  
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dual meanings of concepts in the common law—both jural and normative—
give the common law useful flexibility, allowing it to adapt to new situations.27  
Unconscionability is an interesting creature in the common law—for some 
time, it was a quasi-concept. It had a normative meaning but lacked a jural 
meaning. This made the doctrine unclear, unstable, and unpredictable; to be a 
legal concept, unconscionability must coalesce around a jural meaning as well. 
It must categorize instances predictably, so that like cases can be treated alike, 
be definable in a way that accounts for other concepts in the law, and be situated 
in the common law context of contract law with definable limits, such that it 
works within, not against, current legal concepts. 
By looking at courts’ recent uses of unconscionability to hold contracts of 
adhesion unenforceable, this Comment argues that a structural, rule-like 
meaning has emerged in the concept that should allay concerns about its 
vagueness. This meaning fills in the previously ambiguous conceptions of 
unconscionability with the following definition: when the offeror has reason to 
believe that a reasonable person in the shoes of the offeree would not know the meaning 
of the contract, the offeror cannot impose on the offeree terms either that a reasonable 
person would not expect, or that, even if expected, would impose costs on third parties 
similarly situated to the offeree. In addition to providing predictability, this 
definition fits within the common law system already in place.  
Describing and advocating for unconscionability’s coherence as a concept 
with a jural meaning implicates the debate over the usefulness of legal 
concepts. At the heart of this debate is the American Law Institute’s (ALI) 
project of restating the law by identifying concepts’ structural meaning. 
Realists once ridiculed this project as “the last . . . gasp of a dying 
tradition.”28 Yet it continues to serve a central role in the law. Today, the ALI 
is embarking on a third Restatement of Contracts, specifically focusing on 
the issue of contracts of adhesion.29  A conceptual understanding of 
unconscionability would be useful to parties to the ALI’s project.  
At the same time, offering a conceptual understanding implicates support 
for the ALI’s project of legal conceptual analysis. It also implicates support 
 
27 See id. at 1273 (“The combination of the stable jural meaning and the flexible normative 
meaning with which common law concepts can be imbued creates an important equilibrium. This 
equilibrium allows the common law to guide behavior, promote reliance, and ground 
decisionmaking, while at the same time remaining open and receptive to competing normative 
theories and values.”). 
28 See Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense” and System in the Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
16, 52 (2000) (quoting Legal Realist Felix Cohen).  
29 See OREN BAR-GILL & OMRI BEN-SHAHAR, OUTLINE: RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 
THIRD, CONSUMER CONTRACTS 1-4 (2012), http://www.ballardspahr.com/~/media/files/ 
alerts/2012-12-06-outline.pdf [http://perma.cc/XF5S-8PPA] (describing how the area of consumer 
contracts has become distinct from commercial contracts). 
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for courts’ continued use of unconscionability to reign in contracts of 
adhesion. These normative implications underlie the primarily descriptive 
approach of this Comment. 
Despite the need for a new conceptual synthesis of the doctrine in light 
of recent changes, there has been little scholarship on the topic.30 While many 
have focused on whether and to what extent courts should enforce contracts 
of adhesion, few have examined the doctrinal changes that have allowed 
courts to intervene. Besides criticizing unconscionability’s vagueness, most 
scholarship ignores the doctrine, thereby failing to connect with the tools 
courts have to respond to such contracts.31  
Part I describes the history of legal responses to contracts of adhesion and 
the early use of unconscionability. Part II explores the normative meaning of 
unconscionability by considering responses to contracts of adhesion in law and 
economics scholarship, and identifies two well-supported concerns about such 
contracts from an economic perspective. Finally, Part III looks to recent state 
courts’ uses of unconscionability as a response to contracts of adhesion in an 
effort to identify a structural meaning that corresponds with the concept’s 
normative meaning. This Part both argues that unconscionability is becoming 
a coherent concept and analyzes the way the concept complements other 
concepts in the common law.  
I. THE UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE:  
RECENT USAGE AND HISTORY 
A. The Recent Rise in the Use of Unconscionability  
For the majority of the twentieth century, courts used the doctrine of 
unconscionability sparingly.32 Though some cite Williams v. Walker–Thomas 
Furniture Co. 33  and the surrounding period as a heyday for the 
 
30 See Lonegrass, supra note 10, at 7 (“[B]eyond bare recognition, these alternatives to the 
traditional unconscionability approach remain grossly under-analyzed.”). 
31 See, e.g., David Gilo & Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconscionability Through a Market Lens, 52 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 133, 177-86 (2010) (presenting guidelines for when courts should intervene in 
contracts of adhesion, with minimal discussion of current doctrine).  
32 See Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us About How State 
Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 762 (2014) 
(explaining that courts were much less likely to use unconscionability before the twentieth century 
than during and after it); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: 
The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 813 (2004) (citing the law and economics movement as a reason for enforcing 
arbitration clauses in form contracts).  
33 350 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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unconscionability doctrine,34 parties’ success in using it was not statistically 
greater during the late 1960s and 1970s than it was in the 1990s.35 Moreover, 
even in the 1980s and 1990s, parties only occasionally used unconscionability 
to challenge arbitration agreements 36 : appellate courts held contract 
provisions unconscionable in an average of just 1.67 contract arbitration cases 
per year between 1980 and 2001.37  
Things changed with the turn of the millennium. Starting in the early 2000s, 
courts refused to enforce contracts as unconscionable at a much higher rate—an 
average of 7.1 cases per year between 2002 and 2012.38 One scholar found a “nearly 
tenfold” increase in the number of unconscionability cases brought between 1990 
and 2008.39 Most recently, from 2012 to 2014, the highest courts in nine states 
invalidated contract provisions as unconscionable a total of twelve times.40  
 
34 See, e.g., Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,” 102 
GEO. L.J. 1383, 1386 (2013) (“Looking back, it is clear that the [unconscionability] doctrine reached 
the height of its influence within the decade following Williams.”). 
35 See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 18, at 1100-01 (finding no statistically significant change between 
the success rate of unconscionability claims in the period of 1968 to 1980 and the period of 1991 to 2003). 
36 Landrum, supra note 32, at 778; see also, e.g., Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application 
of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 
3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 48 (2006) (finding that California appellate courts from 1982 through 2006 
held arbitration provisions unconscionable 47% of the time and ordinary contracts unconscionable 11% 
of the time). See generally Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: 
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609 (2009) (studying the increase in use 
and success of unconscionability arguments from 1990 through 2008).  
37 My calculations are based on results in the “Total Unc” column of Table 1 in Landrum, supra 
note 32, at 804 tbl.1 (documenting cases finding provisions unconscionable in twenty states).  
38 Id. Using this data set, these results have a p-value of 0.0314. See also id. at 778 (“[T]he 
number of unconscionability cases involving arbitration agreements climbed steadily between 2002 
and 2008. After the peak in 2008, the number of unconscionability cases involving arbitration 
agreements declined somewhat and appears to have stabilized, at least for now.”). 
39 Knapp, supra note 36, at 622.  
40 See Gulfco of Louisiana, Inc. v. Brantley, 2013 Ark. 367, at 11-12, 430 S.W.3d 7, 12 (finding 
lending provisions unconscionable because the borrowers were incapable of making payments even 
before the contract was signed); Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 579 (Ky. 2012) 
(holding unconscionable a provision in an internet service provider agreement requiring 
confidentiality with respect to result of arbitration); Feeney v. Dell Inc., 989 N.E.2d 439, 463-64 
(Mass. 2013) (holding class action waiver unconscionable because it made plaintiffs’ claims 
effectively nonremediable), abrogated by Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); 
Caplin Enters. v. Arrington, 2011-CT-01932-SCT (¶ 19) (Miss. 2014) (concluding that an arbitration 
provision was unconscionable because it included fee-shifting provisions, lacked mutuality of 
obligation to arbitrate, and limited damages); Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 495-96 
(Mo. 2012) (finding a waiver of a right to participate in a class action in a loan agreement 
unconscionable); Kelker v. Geneva-Roth Ventures, 2013 MT 62, ¶¶ 4, 37-38, 369 Mont. 254, 303 
P.3d 777 (holding a payday loan agreement unconscionable for charging an interest rate of 780%); 
State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 45, 329 P.3d 658 (N.M. 2014) (holding 
subprime lending contract charging over 1000% interest unconscionable); Flemma v. Halliburton 
Energy Servs., 2013-NMSC-022, ¶ 25, 303 P.3d 814 (holding arbitration provision unconscionable 
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Additionally, litigants are bringing far more claims based on 
unconscionability now than before. From 2002 to 2012, state courts 
considered an average of 28.3 claims annually, compared to just 8.67 between 
1980 and 2001.41 This increase likely reflects lawyers’ recognition of courts’ 
greater receptiveness to the unconscionability doctrine. However, it may also, 
or instead, reflect greater incidence of contracts of adhesion, greater 
resistance to arbitration, or other increases in violations of consumers’ rights.  
In addition to the number of successful claims, the percentage of claims that 
turn out to be successful has also sharply increased: in one recent survey, 
courts found contract provisions unconscionable in approximately 23% of 
cases considering an unconscionability claim.42  
B. The Origins of Unconscionability 
Although the doctrine is “new” in the sense that it is being used in new 
ways and with increased frequency, it dates back to the seventeenth century.43 
It began in English courts of equity and was often used interchangeably with 
public policy.44 It burgeoned in the English common law in Earl of Chesterfield 
v. Janssen as a way for courts to invalidate a contract “such as no man in his 
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest 
and fair man would accept on the other.”45 This oft-quoted statement was 
actually dicta; the chancellor enforced the debt agreement in that case because 
the disadvantaged party made it “fully informed and with his eyes open”46—
language American courts later echoed.47 Nevertheless, this early example 
 
and therefore void as opposed to public policy); Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 
230 (Tex. 2014) (refusing to enforce assignment of arbitration costs clause as unconscionable because 
it was not in conformity with statutory provisions governing the waiver of procedural rights); Hill 
v. Garda CL Nw., Inc., 308 P.3d 635, 638-40 (Wash. 2013) (holding labor agreement provisions giving 
just fourteen days to bring a claim and assigning all arbitration costs to employees unconscionable); 
Brown v. MHN Gov’t Servs., 306 P.3d 948, 956-58 (Wash. 2013) (applying California law to hold 
the statute of limitations, arbitrator selection, and fee shifting provisions unconscionable); Gandee 
v. LDL Freedom Enters., 293 P.3d 1197, 1201-02 (Wash. 2013) (refusing to enforce arbitration provision 
assigning costs to consumer that were prohibitive, and giving only thirty days to bring a claim).  
41 Landrum, supra note 32, at 804 tbl.1.  
42 Id. at 779. 
43 See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 
80-82 (2006) (describing the origins of unconscionability).  
44 See Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 43, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 
(“Unconscionability is an equitable doctrine, rooted in public policy . . . .” (citation omitted)).  
45 (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100; Schmitz, supra note 43, at 81-82 (discussing the Earl of Chesterfield 
v. Janssen case). 
46 Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. at 102. 
47 See, e.g., Wm. R. Clarke Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 938 P.2d 372, 384 (Cal. 1997) (“This 
record shows the parties entered into their agreements voluntarily with their eyes open.”).  
  
788 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 779 
 
demonstrates the two-pronged analysis under the doctrine: some procedural 
“defect” had to accompany the substantive harshness for the court to intervene.  
However, in other cases, the presence of a procedural defect seemed 
almost irrelevant. In Twisleton v. Griffith, a court refused to enforce a son’s 
contract selling his remainder interest in his father’s estate because the 
contract would have prevented the estate from being passed on to his heirs.48 
The court found the relief necessary to prevent “unconscionable practices,” 
recognizing that the contract would have a serious impact on third parties.49 
However, its minimal analysis was indistinct from a public policy analysis.  
Some early American cases considered the concept of unconscionability 
with similarly ambiguous analyses.50 In Hume v. United States, the Supreme 
Court considered an unconscionability argument by a seller of goods to a 
government hospital who alleged that the contract for sale had mistakenly 
substituted sixty cents per hundred weight rather than sixty cents per pound.51 
The resulting price for his goods was thus drastically lower than market price.52 
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the seller’s unconscionability 
argument, finding that he had knowingly and willfully agreed to the lower 
price.53 Though apparently nodding to the need for a procedural defect to 
satisfy the unconscionability doctrine, the Court did not explicitly recognize 
the dual prongs of the doctrine, nor did it describe unconscionability in any 
way that might distinguish it from public policy.  
1. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood and Contracts of Adhesion 
The seeds for the modern unconscionability doctrine were sown in the 
late-nineteenth century case Railroad Co. v. Lockwood.54  Although the 
Supreme Court used public policy, not unconscionability, to void contract 
provisions in that case, 55  it employed some of the hallmarks of modern 
 
48 (1716) 24 Eng. Rep. 403, 403-04. 
49 Id. at 404.  
50  In early America, the unconscionability doctrine was seldom invoked. See JOSEPH M. 
PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.2, at 380 (rev. ed. 2002) (“In general . . . courts of law 
did not directly condemn a contract as unconscionable but resorted to imaginative flanking devices 
to defeat the offending contract” including “failure of consideration[,] . . . lack of mutual assent, 
duress or misrepresentation . . . .”); Landrum, supra note 32, at 761-62 (noting the increase in 
courts’ willingness to find contracts unconscionable).  
51 132 U.S. 406, 407 (1889).  
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 415.  
54 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873) (Bradley, J.); see Barnes, supra note 1, at 132 (discussing Lockwood 
as an early example of courts dealing with contracts of adhesion).  
55 See Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 380 (“[T]he conditions imposed by common carriers 
ought not to be adverse (to say the least) to the dictates of public policy and morality.”). 
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unconscionability analysis: the Court accounted for the consumer’s lack of 
knowledge of the terms and recognized the impact mass-marketed contracts 
can have on other consumers. These elements would become important 
elements of contemporary unconscionability doctrine.  
In Lockwood, the Court considered a contract between a cattle drover and 
a railroad shipping company.56 The contract allowed the cattle drover to travel 
for free with his cattle from Buffalo to Albany, but also required him to give 
up his right to sue the shipper for any injury caused by the shipper’s 
negligence.57 The Court noted that the cattle drover had no “reasonable and 
practicable alternative” to the shipper, which was a powerful railroad 
corporation,58 and thus had no “real freedom of choice” with respect to the 
contract’s terms.59 The Court used surprisingly modern language:  
The carrier and his customer do not stand on a footing of equality. The latter is only one 
individual of a million. He cannot afford to higgle or stand out and seek redress in the 
courts. His business will not admit such a course. He prefers, rather, to accept any bill of 
lading, or sign any paper the carrier presents; often, indeed, without knowing what the one 
or the other contains. In most cases, he has no alternative but to do this, or abandon his 
business. In the present case, for example, the freight agent of the company testified that 
though they made forty or fifty contracts every week like that under consideration, and 
had carried on the business for years, no other arrangement than this was ever made with 
any drover. [To decline the contract would require drovers to pay high tariffs for their 
transportation.] Of course no drover could afford to pay such tariff rates. This fact is 
adverted to for the purpose of illustrating how completely in the power of the railroad 
companies parties are; and how necessary it is to stand firmly by those principles of law by 
which the public interests are protected.60 
Moreover, the fact that the other local drovers “all signed similar agreements” 
only further demonstrated the drover’s lack of choice.61 Every hallmark of a 
contract of adhesion was present: unequal bargaining power, the presence of 
boilerplate language, the drover’s lack of knowledge about the contract’s 
contents, and the drover’s economic straits. 
The case demonstrates that the problem of contracts of adhesion was 
common even as early as the late-nineteenth century; the Court reviewed many 
cases about the transportation of drovers with their cattle that involved 
 
56 Id. at 358. 
57 Id. at 359.  
58 Id. at 379; see also id. at 380 (“[The shipping industry] is mostly concentrated in a few 
powerful corporations, whose position in the body politic enables them to control it. They do, in 
fact, control it, and impose such conditions upon travel and transportation as they see fit, which the 
public is compelled to accept.”). 
59 Id. at 379. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 358, 381.  
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contracts shielding carriers from liability.62 It also shows that courts were aware 
of the challenge these contracts posed to their notions about fair contracting.  
With great prescience, the Court also noted the potential positive market 
effects of such liability-shielding clauses:  
A modification of the strict rule of responsibility, exempting the carrier from liability for 
accidental losses, where it can be safely done, enables the carrying interest to reduce its 
rates of compensation; thus proportionally relieving the transportation of produce and 
merchandise from some of the burden with which it is loaded.63  
In other words, the removal of liability might pass on benefits to consumers 
in the form of cheaper rates. The Court recognized this possible economic 
advantage of such clauses—a feature that would motivate many opponents of 
courts meddling in contracts of adhesion a century later.  
In addition to market benefits, the Court acknowledged the right, seen as 
fundamental at the time, to contract freely:  
To say the parties have not a right to make their own contract, and to limit the precise extent of 
their own respective risks and liabilities, in a matter no way affecting the public morals, or 
conflicting with the public interests, would, in [the Court’s] judgment, be an unwarrantable 
restriction upon trade and commerce, and a most palpable invasion of personal right.64  
But the Lockwood Court rejected the idea that this right is free of limitations, 
recognizing a larger social interest in limiting this type of contract:  
Is it true that the public interest is not affected by individual contracts of the kind referred 
to? Is not the whole business community affected by holding such contracts valid? If held 
valid, the advantageous position of the companies exercising the business of common 
carriers is such that it places it in their power to change the law of common carriers in 
effect, by introducing new rules of obligation.65 
The Court insisted that contracts and the rules that govern them do not just 
affect the parties to the contracts, but also the entire industry. In part on these 
grounds, the Court found the provision insulating the railroad from liability 
void as against public policy.66  
In some ways, the Lockwood Court’s reasoning is archetypal of public 
policy analysis. The Court referenced legislative intent and purposes, 
frequently noting statutory and common law efforts to impose liability on 
common carriers.67 The Court also rejected the idea that the expectations of 
 
62 Id. at 361-72. 
63 Id. at 360.  
64 Id. at 378. 
65 Id. at 378-79. 
66 Id. at 381-82. 
67 See, e.g., id. at 373 (discussing the English Railway and Canal Traffic Act); id. at 377-78 
(noting the common law treatment of common carriers as insurers); id. at 381 (describing how courts 
require contracts to be “just and reasonable”).  
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the parties should govern the interpretation of the contract, referring back to 
the contract being “absolute in its terms.”68  
Although the Court held the provision unenforceable against public 
policy with no mention of unconscionability, the case foreshadowed later 
developments in the unconscionability doctrine. The Court recognized the 
objective assent model in contract law by holding that the contract was validly 
formed. But the Court also accounted for the consumer’s lack of knowledge 
of the terms and recognized the impact a ruling on one contract can have on 
other consumers. 69  These would become important elements of the 
unconscionability doctrine a century later.  
Lockwood did not launch a new approach to contracts of adhesion 
generally, but rather its impact was confined to the law governing common 
carriers. Although the Court was surprisingly candid about its consideration 
of the parties’ economic situations, its reasoning would not extend to 
contracts of adhesion used in other kinds of businesses; essential to the 
Lockwood Court’s conclusion was its finding that the railroad was a common 
carrier, not an ordinary bailee, and therefore was required to operate under 
the common law standard of being an insurer. 70  This particularized 
application of a rule is paradigmatic of the preformalist thinking of the 
nineteenth century. 71  Indeed, as the common law became increasingly 
conceptual and generalized during the late-nineteenth century—a movement 
labeled legal formalism—some pushed to allow common carriers to contract 
out of strict liability in order to make contracting in transportation more 
similar to the general maxims in contract law.72 The concepts undergirding 
the Court’s reasoning in Lockwood were ultimately buried under the more 
general concepts of freedom to contract that dominated the rest of contract law.  
 
68 Id. at 362; see also Barnes, supra note 1, at 134 (“Contract law calls us to enforce promises 
because they carry the imprimatur of assent. We need not throw out objectivity, but we should be 
particularly vigilant to the absence of assent in standardized transactions like the one in Lockwood.”).  
69 Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 379.  
70 See id. at 376 (rejecting the railroad’s argument that it was a bailee because its business 
inherently entailed special responsibilities).  
71 See HORWITZ, supra note 19, at 11-13 (describing the resistance to generalization, in favor of the 
law’s organization according to profession and “functional relationship,” in the nineteenth century).  
72  See, e.g., id. at 14 (describing how Oliver Wendell Holmes, a proponent of legal 
categorization, thought strict liability for common carriers was “a merely empirical exception from 
general doctrine” and therefore that courts should allow common carriers to “contract out” of strict 
liability, in conformance with the general policy in the common law allowing it).  
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2. Unconscionability and the U.C.C. 
The unconscionability doctrine was not fully accepted as a defense to a 
breach of contract until the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code 
in 1951,73 which provided,  
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been 
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit 
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.74 
The commentators justified the section on unconscionability with reference 
to Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,75 a case voiding a contract of adhesion on the 
basis of public policy.76 In Campbell Soup, the Third Circuit considered a 
contract provision imposed by a powerful company on a relatively powerless 
farmer requiring specific performance of the sale of his carrots, and held it 
void as against public policy. 77  The U.C.C. thus linked the trend from 
Lockwood and Campbell Soup of using public policy to curb contracts of 
adhesion with the new concept of unconscionability.  
As evidenced by the citation to Campbell Soup, U.C.C. section 2-302 was 
originally intended to address contracts of adhesion.78 Karl Llewellyn, the 
chief reporter of the drafting process and a champion of Legal Realism,79 
pushed for a provision that would enable courts to invalidate or weaken the 
force of many such contracts.80 Llewellyn had drafted earlier versions of the 
section, providing that contract provisions that were “unfair and unbalanced” 
and “not required by the circumstances of the trade” are only enforceable if 
it can be shown that the nondrafting party knew about them and intended 
 
73  See Barnes, supra note 1, at 149-50 (“[Unconscionability’s] acceptance as a mainstream 
doctrine, a ready aid in contract limitation, dates back only to its inclusion in the U.C.C.”). 
74 U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2014).  
75 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949). 
76 See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (citing Campbell Soup for the proposition that unconscionability 
seeks to prevent “oppression and unfair surprise”).  
77 172 F.2d at 81, 83. 
78 See Leff, supra note 11, at 492 (explaining that early versions of the section were “explicitly 
made applicable to ‘form clauses’ only” (footnote omitted)).  
79 Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940–49, 51 SMU L. 
REV. 275, 276-77 (1997). 
80 See id. at 490-91 (discussing the drafting history of section 2-302); id. at 488 n.11 (using 
“draftsman” to refer to Karl Llewellyn throughout, but conceding that “[t]he part Professor 
Llewellyn played in the final form of § 2-302 is hard to assess”). This article refers to Llewellyn by 
name, rather than using Leff’s moniker, “draftsman,” because Llewellyn’s influence was undoubtedly 
great in these early drafts. See id. (noting that Karl Lewellyn was the primary draftsman at the early 
stages of the U.C.C., especially of the Sales article).  
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them to modify the general provisions of the U.C.C.81 A 1943 version of 
section 2-302 specifically addressed contracts of adhesion, providing that 
they would be enforceable except when unconscionable.82 The commentary 
to the early versions sought to address the problem that the signer often did 
not know what the contract contained.83  
Facing opposition from other drafters, Llewellyn’s proposed limitation on 
such contracts was eventually reduced to declaring contracts as a whole, or clauses 
within contracts, unenforceable if found “unconscionable.”84 This final version 
did not explicitly orient unconscionability toward contracts of adhesion, nor did 
it offer much guidance to courts about the concept’s jural meaning.  
This forced ambiguity is perhaps ironic, as section 2-302 was an explicit 
attempt by the Legal Realists to make judicial reasoning more transparent.85 
The draftsmen explained their objective in an official comment to the section:  
[U.C.C. section 2-302] is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly 
against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the past such 
policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of 
the rules of offer and acceptance or by determination that the clause is contrary to public 
policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. This section is intended to allow the 
court to pass on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to 
make a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability.86 
Llewellyn wanted to eliminate the ambiguity created by courts’ pretenses at 
simply enforcing the law as handed down to them.87 Rather than using ill-
fitting traditional doctrines to hold contracts of adhesion unenforceable, 
Llewellyn hoped to provide a doctrine that would allow courts to refuse to 
enforce contracts of adhesion explicitly.88  
Although many Realists decried legal concepts, it would be a mistake to 
presume that Llewellyn’s intent to create a new concept in American contract 
 
81 See id. (quoting the 1941 draft of the U.C.C.). 
82 Id. at 492.  
83 See, e.g., id. (describing the 1943 version’s comment as being concerned about whether both 
parties examine contract provisions before agreeing to them).  
84 U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2014); see also Kamp, supra note 79, at 306-08 (explaining that the term 
“unconscionability” was added at another drafter’s suggestion, but that Llewellyn welcomed it); 
Leff, supra note 11, at 489-92 (highlighting the evolution in language towards “unconscionable” in 
the predecessors to section 2-302).  
85 Cf. Kamp, supra note 79, at 302 (“Another of Llewellyn’s goals was to reform cont[r]acts by 
discarding obsolete formalisms and instituting modern efficiency and flexibility.”).  
86 Leff, supra note 11, at 497; see also supra note 80. 
87 See Leff, supra note 11, at 526-27 (describing Llewellyn’s recognition that judges’ desires to 
come to good results can have a “distorting effect on legal doctrine”). 
88 See Schmitz, supra note 43, at 86-87 (explaining that Llewellyn’s early drafts of what came 
to be U.C.C. section 2-302 “targeted unintended bargains and use of form contracts to create one-
sided ‘private codifications’”).  
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law was contrary to his realist project.89 It is true that Llewellyn pointed out 
the pitfalls of concept-based legal reasoning, famously arguing that “to 
classify is to disturb.” 90  He also feared that concepts would “take on an 
appearance of . . . inherent value” and would “twist any fresh observation 
of data into conformity with the terms of the categories.” 91  Llewellyn 
preached extreme caution with regard to legal concepts. 
But this oversimplifies Llewellyn’s intentions. Llewellyn did not object to 
concepts per se, but rather to the blind application of concepts to particular 
factual situations without concern for their purposes.92 He was frustrated 
with the opaque reasoning of the Formalists who, he believed, employed rusty 
doctrines that distorted the real purpose behind the rules.93 He argued that 
“a concept, as I understand it, is built for a purpose. It is a thinking tool. It is 
to make your data more manageable in doing something, in getting 
somewhere with them.” 94  Indeed, Llewellyn’s project was not to remove 
concepts from the law, but rather to shift the “focal point of legal discussion” 
to judicial behavior and its practical effects.95 He rejected the formalist view 
that rules on paper constituted the law but embraced the view that law was 
made up of various practical as-applied rules.96 Thus, Llewellyn may have 
been enthusiastic about the infusion of a new concept into the common law 
inasmuch as the concept more accurately revealed what judges were actually 
doing and would be used and assessed with an eye toward its practical effects.97  
Indeed, Llewellyn explicitly recognized the importance of concepts, 
calling them “not only . . . existent, but . . . highly useful, indeed vital.”98 
 
89 See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 19, at 200 (“Hostility to conceptualism was a hallmark of 
Legal Realist criticism.”); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–REALIST DIVIDE: 
THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 59 (2010) (stating that formalist critics argued that 
mechanical concepts were often used to cover up decisions that were based on ideology).  
90 Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 453 (1930). 
91 Id.  
92 See id. at 438 (arguing that concepts “have had great value” inasmuch as they direct thinkers 
to consider a law’s purpose). 
93 See Schauer, supra note 21, at 532 (“[Llewellyn] believed that formalism, as the obeisance to 
the literal language of a rule, could frustrate the rule’s purpose and lead to difficulties where the 
practical consequences of the decision would indicate a different result.”). 
94 Llewellyn, supra note 90, at 431.  
95 Id. at 442-43.  
96 See Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 766 (2013) (explaining that 
Llewellyn denied that “the real rules” were the rules that “happened to be written down in law books”).  
97 See Llewellyn, supra note 90, at 452 (arguing that a written law, or “official formulation,” 
does not have “value in itself” but rather derives meaning “in terms of its workings,” which is 
evaluated by comparison with “the results desired”); see also Leff, supra note 2, at 137-40 (arguing 
that to call contracts of adhesion “contracts” at all is to apply an overly general and ill-fitting 
definition of “contract” to the transaction).  
98 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 49 (Frederick Schauer ed., 2011).  
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He also argued that those rules that succeeded in constraining officials, in 
getting them to treat like cases alike, were better than those that failed to do 
so.99 Perhaps much more than other Realists of his time, Llewellyn embraced 
the potential for constraint that legal rules imposed. Therefore, it was entirely 
consistent with his philosophy to propose a new concept of unconscionability 
that might push judges to decide cases differently.  
3. The Years of Ambiguity for Unconscionability 
Since Llewellyn’s infusion of unconscionability into American law 
through the U.C.C.,100 courts have applied the unconscionability doctrine 
broadly to hold unenforceable many types of provisions in adhesive contracts, 
including lack of mutuality regarding obligations or remedial options, 101 
limitations on remedies, 102  imposition of excessive fees, fee-shifting, or 
excessively high interest rates, 103  selection of an extremely inconvenient 
 
99 Id. at 74-75.  
100  The Second Restatement of Contracts, in 1981, followed the U.C.C. by adding an 
unconscionability provision:  
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may 
refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid 
any unconscionable result.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). In addition to the 
Restatement, all states but Louisiana adopted the U.C.C. provision in some form. Schmitz, supra 
note 43, at 89. 
101 See, e.g., E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 60 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ark. 2001) (concluding that 
lack of mutuality in an arbitration agreement rendered it unenforceable); Armendariz v. Found. 
Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689-99 (Cal. 2000) (finding nonmutual arbitration clause 
substantively unconscionable); Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, Inc., 1999 MT 63, ¶ 32, 293 Mont. 512, 977 
P.2d 989, 996 (“[T]his case presents a clear example of an arbitration provision that lacks mutuality 
of obligation, is one-sided, and contains terms that are unreasonably favorable to the drafter.”); 
Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861-62 (W. Va. 1998) (finding arbitration 
clause unenforceable in part because the parties’ rights were “inherently inequitable” (citation 
omitted)). Prior to 1990, some states applied mutuality of obligation as an independent doctrine. 
See Stempel, supra note 32, at 804 n.166 (discussing courts’ uses of the doctrine of mutuality of 
obligation in the context of arbitration clauses).  
102 See, e.g., Mandel v. Household Bank (Nev.) Nat’l Ass’n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 385-86 (Ct. 
App. 2003) (finding clause that restricted access to class actions to remedy breaches unconscionable).  
103 See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that an 
arbitration clause’s requirement that the loser pay the opponent’s legal fees was substantively 
unconscionable); Kelker v. Geneva-Roth Ventures, 2013 MT 62, ¶¶ 4, 37-38, 369 Mont. 254, 303 
P.3d 777 (holding an interest rate of 780% unconscionable); State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., 
2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 49, 329 P.3d 658 (N.M. 2014) (concluding that loan agreements containing 
“quadruple-digit interest rate[s]” were unconscionable). 
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forum,104 and unduly short deadlines for filing claims.105 The concept has also 
been used as a tool to protect the poor in particular, especially from usurious 
loan or credit agreements.106  
This has led some to argue that unconscionability is not a coherent 
doctrine at all, but rather a conglomeration of factors, enumerated and 
checked off by courts. 107  The Montana Supreme Court opined that 
“unconscionability lacks a succinct or precise definition” but rather was 
defined by a list of elements,108 while the Supreme Court of Texas explained 
that unconscionability is “not a concept, but a determination to be made in 
light of a variety of factors not unifiable into a formula.”109 The Wisconsin 
Supreme court stated that “[n]o single, precise definition of substantive 
unconscionability can be articulated.”110 Many courts still view the doctrine as 
either a subsidiary of, or even duplicative of, public policy. For example, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court explained that the flexibility in unconscionability 
comes from its roots as “an equitable doctrine, rooted in public policy.”111 
 
104 See, e.g., Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1287 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that while 
forum selection clauses are generally enforceable, if the forum is “unduly oppressive” or the clause 
has “the effect of shielding the stronger party from liability,” a clause may be found unconscionable 
(citations omitted)). 
105 See, e.g., Hill v. Garda CL Nw., Inc., 308 P.3d 635, 639 (Wash. 2013) (holding that a 
fourteen-day limitation on filing a claim was unconscionable). Many of the cases and criteria are 
provided in Stempel, supra note 32, at 803-07. 
106 See, e.g., Gulfco of La., Inc. v. Brantley, 2013 Ark. 367, at 12, 430 S.W.3d 7, 14 (holding a 
loan agreement unconscionable because the stronger party knew that there was no reasonable 
probability that the buyers would be able to repay it); Fleming, supra note 34, at 1432-37 (discussing 
the aftermath of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and arguing 
that unconscionability as the “law of the poor” was used temporarily, before it was neutralized into 
a law for consumers, regardless of wealth).  
107 See, e.g., DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 18, at 1075 (“As in most cases of judicial application 
of legal standards, the courts will often enumerate a number of factors that they use in applying the 
standard to the novelty of real world disputes.”). 
108 Kelker, 2013 MT 62 at ¶ 24 (citation omitted). 
109 Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. 2014) (quoting 27 STEPHEN 
COCHRAN, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: CONSUMER RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 4.2 (3d ed. 
2002)).  
110 Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 2006 WI 53, ¶ 36, 290 Wis. 2d 514, 714 N.W.2d 155.  
111 Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 43, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803. The 
United States Supreme Court viewed California’s doctrine of unconscionability similarly when it 
held it to be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740 (2011). The Supreme Court referred to applying “the general principle of unconscionability 
or public-policy disapproval,” id. at 1747, effectively equating the two. Cf. id. at 1750 (calling various 
elements of California’s analysis “toothless and malleable” and as having “no limiting effect”). Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence considers the nature of an unconscionability defense, and almost explicitly calls 
it analytically indistinct from public policy. See id. at 1755-56 (Thomas, J. concurring) (summarizing 
and responding to the lower court’s analysis by saying, “[r]efusal to enforce a contract for public-policy 
reasons does not concern whether the contract was properly made”). 
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Courts’ vague definitions of unconscionability invite further criticism. 
Courts look for contract terms that are “harsh[],” “unfair,” “unreasonabl[e],” 
“one-sided,” or “oppressive” to indicate substantive unconscionability.112 One 
court defined an unconscionable contract as “one abhorrent to good morals 
and conscience.”113 As one scholar stated, “[u]nconscionability begins and 
ends with the conscience.” 114  Although ambiguity is not unique to the 
unconscionability doctrine—indeed, the U.C.C. repeats the requirement of 
reasonableness throughout 115 —the primary objection leveled against the 
doctrine of unconscionability is that it is nothing but reference to ambiguous 
norms—in other words, that it lacks any core jural meaning.116 Numerous 
scholars have argued that the ambiguity causes unpredictability and creates 
 
112  See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(“Unconscionability . . . include[s] an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the 
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” (emphasis 
added)); Basulto v. Hialeah Auto., 141 So.3d 1145, 1160-61 (Fla. 2014) (“In the typical case of 
consumer adhesion contracts, where there is virtually no bargaining between the parties, the 
commercial enterprise or business responsible for drafting the contract is in a position to unilaterally 
create one-sided terms that are oppressive to the consumer, the party lacking bargaining power.” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 1159 (employing a sliding-scale approach in which procedural 
unconscionability is assessed “in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the 
substantive terms themselves” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); id. at 1157-58 (“[T]he 
unreasonableness of the terms is often referred to as substantive unconscionability . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 93 A.3d 760, 766 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) 
(“[A] contract is unenforceable if its terms are manifestly unfair or oppressive and are dictated by a 
dominant party.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 
2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 32, 329 P.3d 658 (N.M. 2014) (“Contract provisions that unreasonably benefit 
one party over another are substantively unconscionable.”). But see Commercial Real Estate Inv. v. 
Comcast of Utah II, Inc., 2012 UT 49, ¶ 44, 285 P.3d 1193, 1203-04 (“It is not sufficient for the 
liquidated damages clause to be ‘unreasonable or more advantageous to one party.’ Instead, ‘we 
consider whether a contract’s terms are so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent 
party or whether there exists an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the 
bargain according to the mores and business practices of the time and place.’” (citation omitted)). 
113 Results Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford, 538 S.E.2d 73, 80 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted). 
114 See Barnes, supra note 1, at 161. 
115 See id. at 149 n.121 (“What better way to define a legal concept that is overly broad than to 
use overly broad substitute words. This vague definition shows not only how much room has been 
left for the courts to shape and mold the concept, but also how effective the drafters of the U.C.C. 
were in accomplishing a shift from the pretextual to the explicit in the courts’ reasoning.”).  
116 See Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why Unconscionability Has 
Become a Relic, 105 COM. L.J. 287, 293 (2000) (noting that the U.C.C. and its comments fail to 
provide a “clear-cut definition for courts to follow”); see also Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 
23, at 18 (“Most concepts in the common law . . . have a jural meaning that is discernible through 
the semantic meaning of the concept and its common usage within the interpretive community, 
when viewed from an internal point of view.”). 
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opportunities for improvident judicial meddling.117 Like public policy, they 
argue, it is merely a hollow vehicle for normative inputs.  
A recent trend of using the two-pronged analysis as a sliding scale only 
further muddies the doctrine. An increasing number of courts analyze 
procedural and substantive unconscionability such that a small amount of one 
can be compensated by a large amount of the other, as long as the total 
unconscionability “score” is high enough. 118  The sliding scale method 
provides even greater flexibility, allowing courts to intervene when they see 
particularly harsh terms but relatively benign procedural defects and vice 
versa.119 At least thirteen states apply the sliding scale approach, and the 
number is growing.120 This change will only exacerbate criticisms that the 
unconscionability doctrine is amorphous and unpredictable.  
Critics might say that this amorphousness—this use of the concept with 
respect to particular factual situations rather than in accordance with a clear 
rule-based formulation—illustrates the problem with the realist project. 
Although this accusation would be unfairly leveled against Karl Lewellyn, 
who did not resist legal concepts qua concepts,121 it might be more fairly 
leveled against some of his more adamant contemporaries, such as Felix 
Cohen. Cohen believed that concepts and legal rules distorted the law and 
should be abandoned in favor of practical, policy-oriented reasoning.122 The 
Realists’ opponents charge that, by resisting concepts, the Realists directed 
the courts to abandon the predictability that results from following rules 
 
117 See Leff, supra note 11, at 488 (arguing that U.C.C. section 2-302 is fraught with “amorphous 
unintelligibility” which led to its “final irrelevance”); id. at 496 (“[T]he net result is to make it 
possible under the section [of the U.C.C. defining unconscionability] to strike a single provision in 
a contract even if it had been specifically bargained about and even if it were not forbidden by any 
established doctrine of illegality or public policy, solely on the basis of an ad hoc judicial 
determination of substantive ‘unconscionability.’”); see also Brown, supra note 116, at 292 (arguing 
that section 2-302’s lack of a definition for unconscionability leaves courts without enough guidance 
to handle unconscionability cases). For an argument that the concept’s ambiguity is an asset rather than 
a flaw, see Schmitz, supra note 43, at 74 (seeking “to defend and protect unconscionability’s flexibility”). 
118 See Lonegrass, supra note 10, at 6-7 (describing the “recent swell” of courts employing this 
sliding-scale approach).  
119 Id. 
120 See id. at 6 n.23 (citing cases from California, Illinois, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, that have 
adopted or reaffirmed the sliding scale approach). The Supreme Court of Florida also recently applied 
the sliding scale approach in Basulto v. Hialeah Auto., 141 So.3d 1145, 1159 (Fla. 2014).  
121 See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.  
122 See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 
809, 833-45 (1935) (expressing the author’s prediction, and hope, that “skill in the manipulation of 
legal concepts” will be replaced by a “functional method” that involves looking to the  consequences 
of a legal decision).  
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based on classification.123 They also argue that these Realists ignored the way 
that legal concepts interact with each other in a systematic web.124  
For the first fifty years of its use, unconscionability presented just what 
Cohen defended: a policy-oriented analysis devoid of jural meaning. It 
liberated courts from typical common law jural constraints, allowing them to 
enforce or refuse to enforce a contractual provision based on the judges’ 
beliefs about whether such enforcement was supported by policy concerns.125 
Unconscionability was perhaps exactly what Cohen saw as the ideal legal tool: 
a jurisprudence that “deal[t] with issues ethically and responsibly in terms of 
social policy, one at a time.”126 But before analyzing the recent departure from 
this freedom toward coherence in a developed jural meaning of 
unconscionability, it is helpful to understand the normative use to which the 
concept of unconscionability has been put.  
II. THE NORMATIVE MEANING OF UNCONSCIONABILITY 
A. An Efficiency-Based Normative Meaning 
To understand the normative meaning of the doctrine, it is worth 
reviewing the economic criticisms that informed its development. At the 
same time that courts demonstrated reluctance to invalidate contracts of 
adhesion in the twentieth century, the law and economics literature praised 
such contracts.127 This literature presupposed that freely chosen transactions 
increase value and that the common law should be oriented to maximize 
value.128 Under this framework, supporters of these arguments applauded 
such contracts for being economically efficient.129 But by the end of the 1990s, 
 
123 See Schauer, supra note 21, at 539-45 (explaining that the formalism of rules is “on occasion 
normatively desirable” because it increases predictability); see also L. L. Fuller, American Legal 
Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 446 (1934) (criticizing Llewellyn for believing that thinking must 
be directed toward “particular things” rather than concepts). 
124 See Waldron, supra note 28, at 28-29 (criticizing Felix Cohen for overlooking the importance 
of systematicity in the law).  
125 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
126 Waldron, supra note 28, at 30. 
127 See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 32, at 822-25 (discussing the prominence of law and economics 
scholarship about unconscionability between 1967 and 1997). 
128 See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 270-71 (7th ed. 2007) 
(arguing that the common law demonstrates a commitment to efficiency when it incorporates the 
moral principles that enhance one’s ability to maximize personal satisfaction). See generally George 
L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977) 
(describing the tendency of common law towards efficiency). 
129 See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 630-34 
(2002) (citing Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
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scholars were newly aware that some of the assumptions in the law and 
economics school needed to be adapted because actors are less rational and 
informed than traditional economists had assumed.130 Furthermore, scholars 
realized that in some circumstances, individuals maximizing their own welfare 
would not actually maximize society’s welfare.131 
Two major critiques of contracts of adhesion have emerged from within the 
law and economics movement. First, consumers’ lack of knowledge about the fine 
print in contracts of adhesion can inhibit the accurate pricing of those contracts 
if there are not enough sophisticated consumers to exert market pressure and if 
those consumers are indistinguishable from ignorant consumers. 132  The 
assumption that there are enough consumers with sufficient knowledge to exert 
market pressure underlies free-market arguments,133 but in the absence of such 
knowledge, markets are vulnerable to failure because exchanges do not necessarily 
increase welfare for both parties, since one party may believe she is increasing her 
welfare, when in fact, she is not.134  
 
1173 (1983)) (summarizing and supporting Todd Rakoff’s argument that standard form documents, 
such as contracts of adhesion, are economically efficient).  
130 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1488 (1998) (explaining that the law and economics term of “rationality” can mean many things 
and that the assumptions of rationality are undermined by empirical studies).  
131 Consider, for example, the classic game theory problem posed by the prisoner’s dilemma. 
When each individual pursues the dominant strategy, the total loss is greater than if both prisoners 
cooperated. ALAN DEVLIN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 23-25 (2015). 
132  See Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 945 (2006) 
(explaining that it is infeasible to explain the contents of most contacts of adhesion to an average 
consumer during a purchase, and that this may justify banning those inexplicable clauses); Jaime 
Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 793 (2011) (“[T]he justification 
for unrestricted bargaining is the presence of a functioning market; while not every consumer needs 
to make informed choices, a sufficient quantity of informed consumers must be present for a 
functioning market to exist.”); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003) (“Because buyers are boundedly rational 
rather than fully rational decision makers, when making purchasing decisions they take into account 
only a limited number of product attributes and ignore others.”); Michael I. Meyerson, The 
Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1263, 1270-71 (1993) (explaining that there is no evidence that particularly rigorous shoppers are able 
to affect the market such that most consumers are protected from unfavorable terms); Alan Schwartz 
& Louis L. Wild, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638-39 (1979) (discussing the market pressure “searchers,” or 
people who examine form contracts for unfavorable terms, can exert on the market in part because 
it “is usually too expensive for firms to distinguish among extensive, moderate, and nonsearchers”).  
133 See, e.g., Schwartz & Wild, supra note 132, at 637-38 (arguing that sellers will not offer one-
sided terms if there exists a sufficient minority of informed, price-sensitive consumers).  
134 See Barnes, supra note 1, at 184 (“If anything, the lack of bargaining and lack of power to 
bargain suggest a noncompetitive situation in which any resultant harsh terms will impose greater 
and unforeseen costs on the weaker party.”).  
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Second, if businesses can distinguish between knowledgeable consumers 
and ignorant consumers, they will offer fairer terms to the knowledgeable 
than they will to the ignorant, and the presence of knowledgeable consumers 
in the market will not help the others.135 Thus, in order for a good to be priced 
efficiently, businesses must not be able to differentiate between these types 
of consumers, and there must be enough of them to exert market pressure.  
It is possible that contracts of adhesion have actually increased societal 
welfare. This could be true if, for example, the current assignment of liabilities 
to businesses through burdensome litigation costs more than the value of the 
vindicated rights to the consumer–beneficiaries.136 But it is also possible, as 
described above, that contracts of adhesion decrease societal welfare by taking 
rights from consumers that they value at an amount greater than the amount 
they are trading them for, merely out of misunderstanding.137  
The argument that contracts of adhesion reduce consumer welfare is 
furthered by establishing that consumers’ failure to learn about contracts’ terms 
is, in fact, rational, because the time it takes consumers to read each contract, 
plus the time and money it would take to hire an attorney to help the average 
consumer understand the contract, usually vastly outweighs the likelihood that 
any term in that contract will harm the consumer. 138  Thus, reasonable 
 
135 See Baird, supra note 132, at 939 (“At the very least, one should pay attention to whether the 
market is one in which sellers can discriminate between those buyers who are sophisticated and 
those who are not.”).  
136 This was contemplated by Judge Richard Posner in Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. 
Donovan, when he stated,  
We may assume, since the market in surety bonds is a competitive one, that the cost savings 
that accrue to Northwestern from contractual terms that facilitate the enforcement of one 
of its bonds will be passed on, in part anyway, to the purchaser of those bonds—the 
enterprise in which the defendants invested—in the form of lower premium. If so, the 
defendants were compensated in advance for bearing the burden of which they now complain, 
and will reap a windfall if they are permitted to repudiate the forum selection clause.  
916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990). No data exists to determine whether this is true; even if it is true 
in some situations, it would likely vary from market to market.  
137  For example, some law and economics scholars have advocated for the law making 
transactions more transparent. This would decrease the cost of information such that products could 
be more accurately priced in the market. See Baird, supra note 132, at 949 (explaining that effective 
legal rules about fine print should make it easier for buyers to shop, reducing search costs). This 
would be an important step but may not be a sufficient one because the concepts are difficult, the 
provisions are many, and consumers may rationally continue to remain ignorant. See Robert A. 
Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 837, 839 (2006) (expressing concern about requiring mandatory disclosures and 
speculating that such disclosures may not incentivize consumers to read them while making it more 
likely that they would be enforced).  
138 See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets 
the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 600 (1990) (explaining that, because of the costs, it is “rational 
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consumers do not read contracts of adhesion. A consumer is better off clicking 
“I agree” and purchasing a song for one dollar than attempting to tackle the 
extensive contract that attends the purchase. This is the problem of rational 
ignorance. It applies to sophisticated consumers as well as unsophisticated ones, 
and it makes contracts of adhesion particularly likely to disadvantage 
consumers. 139 Indeed, empirical data shows that only one or two in every 
thousand consumers even glance at adhesive contracts in online transactions.140 
The argument that consumers will account for the price of risk does not 
necessarily address these fears. Some believe that the fact that a provision 
was unknown to the consumer does not necessarily preclude it from being 
priced into the market; rather, the market prices in the risk the consumer 
assumes by agreeing to be bound by unknown terms.141 But since consumers 
do not generally know the magnitude of the risk, nor the likelihood that 
certain unfavorable consequences will result, they are unlikely to price this 
risk accurately. Or, similarly, consumers may believe that they are facing less 
risk than they are in actuality. In that case, consumers would not be pricing 
uncertainty, but rather would be pricing a false sense of certainty. When 
consumers are ill-equipped to accurately price the risk they face, businesses 
can take advantage of this ignorance to drive hard bargains.  
Additionally, courts and scholars have begun to recognize that contracts 
of adhesion impose costs on consumers who are not party to the contract by 
 
for even a conscientious consumer to pay little, if any, attention to subordinate contract terms”). 
Another way of describing the problem is through recognition of “bounded rationality”: consumers’ 
cognition is limited, often because of alternative priorities, such that they often fail to make the 
choices that economists would predict. See Jolls et al., supra note 130, at 1505-17 (explaining that 
bounded rationality and fairness concerns have “real predictive and explanatory power,” and 
describing scenarios in which consumers behave contrary to the way a wealth-maximizing consumer 
would behave); Korobkin, supra note 132, at 1292-93 (arguing that we can “describe an individual’s 
decision to sacrifice accuracy in order to minimize effort as a ‘rational’ choice” because of our 
cognitive limitations). 
139 For further discussion on the market inefficiencies of contracts of adhesion, see generally 
Gilo & Porat, supra note 31 (arguing that traditionally oppressive terms can be curbed by market 
competition, but terms that affect only a select number of consumers and terms that are obscured 
by complex contractual language distort the market and demand intervention).  
140 Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form 
Contracts 2 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 195, 2014); see also id. (“Such a small 
number of contract readers would seem to cast doubt on the existence of an informed minority of a 
size sufficient to police against one-sided terms, at least in the context of software sold online.”).  
141 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 129, at 635-37 (arguing that when consumers agree to contracts 
they have not read or understood, they are assuming risk, something they do frequently in many 
other aspects of their lives). Barnett’s argument implies that consumers pay less as a result of 
assuming the risk in form contracts, because the expected value of the contract is lower when the 
consumer bears higher expected costs of litigation and lower likelihood of favorable dispute 
resolution. See, e.g., DEVLIN, supra note 131, at 37 (explaining that “[t]he expected value of a 
particular choice . . . is the average of the probability distribution of all potential returns”).  
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generating collective action or coordinated action problems.142 This happens 
in two main ways. First, coordinated action problems exist in the right to sue 
as a member of a class. If others do not have the right to sue as a member of 
a class, no individual has an incentive to bargain (and thus pay more) for that 
right, since she would not be able to exercise it.  
Second, coordinated action problems can arise in arbitration 
confidentiality agreements. Consumers do not have an incentive to bargain 
and pay more to eliminate confidentiality clauses in arbitration provisions, 
because an individual’s silence does not cost her significantly. But her silence 
costs future consumers, who cannot evaluate the fairness of an arbitrator or 
the results of past arbitrations on similar issues when they cannot access the 
relevant data on that arbitrator’s past awards. In contrast, businesses are 
generally repeat players and have their own sets of data about arbitrators from 
which to draw to ensure favorable rulings. 143 Thus a consumer acting in 
pursuit of her own welfare alone can disadvantage other consumers and give 
businesses the upper hand.  
Within the law and economics tradition, these collective action problems 
justify intervention because individuals pursuing their own ends will not 
actually maximize societal welfare. A collective action problem exists when 
the option that individuals most prefer—call it Option A—is only valuable 
when others participate.144 In the absence of others’ participation, individuals 
are best served by making a different choice—call it Option B. In cases where 
individuals cannot be sure that others will choose Option A, they will choose 
Option B. Because all individuals choose the less-preferable Option B, the 
result for society is suboptimal. In the face of collective action problems, 
market forces pushing individuals to choose Option B are actually 
counterproductive. Such circumstances beg for coordinated intervention, 
either by the government or other actors. 
B. A Rights-Based Normative Meaning 
Although most of the literature on unconscionability and contracts of 
adhesion emphasizes their economic advantages and disadvantages, it is worth 
 
142 See infra notes 173–95 and accompanying text.  
143 See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 
52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 219 (2004) (“The drafter is likely a repeat participant in arbitrations, and so has 
advantages in arbitrator selection and case presentation.”).  
144 See Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class 
Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 74 (2007) (“Collective action problems exist whenever 
individual members of a group, by pursuing their own short-term self-interest, act in a manner that 
makes every member worse off in the long run.”). 
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noting that a moral or rights-based argument could be made against these 
contracts as well. For example, Seana Shiffrin argues that unconscionability is 
a way for the state to exercise its independent moral judgment to decline to 
enforce a contract. 145  Along similar lines, Nicolas Cornell argues that the 
normative meaning of the unconscionability doctrine is a kind of moral 
standing requirement, where a complainant loses the right to complain about a 
breach because of his or her own bad behavior.146 
Another rights-based objection to contracts of adhesion considers 
contracts as promises. 147  Under this view, it is antithetical to a person’s 
integrity to consider her to have promised to do or refrain from doing 
something of which she is unaware. These rights-based views may undergird 
many peoples’ objections to contracts of adhesion.  
Much more could be said about the rights-based views that support the 
doctrine of unconscionability. For now, I put them aside because the doctrine 
of unconscionability follows from that perspective more naturally than it does 
from a law and economics perspective. Because rights-based views rely less 
on subjective valuation, they have less difficulty justifying judicial 
interference in freely made bargains. 148 In fact, those views would likely 
justify a more expansive jural meaning of unconscionability than the one I 
offer. The explanatory work needed to connect those views with the jural 
meaning I offer would come from a very different angle: explaining not why 
unconscionability should reach the contracts that it does, but rather why it 
should not reach more contracts than it does under this jural meaning. That 
work is beyond the scope of this Comment.  
 
145 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 205, 223 (2000). Other scholars hint at this argument by emphasizing the extent to which 
unconscionability can protect the poor. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 34, at 1400-02 (discussing the 
objections leveled by Friedrich Kessler that contracts of adhesion “threatened to empower a new ‘feudal 
order’ of ‘powerful industrial and commercial overlords’” (citing Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of 
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943)).  
146 Nicolas Cornell, A Complaint Oriented Approach to Unconscionability, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming April 2016).  
147 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 16 (2d ed. 2015) (“An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has 
intentionally invoked a convention whose function is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another 
to expect the promised performance.” (footnote omitted)); Cornell, supra note 146 (“[W]hatever the 
explanation for why voluntarily promising generates a moral obligation, that same explanation can 
potentially be used to describe why contracts create obligations.”). 
148 Compare DEVLIN, supra note 131, at 51 (“[L]aw and economics focuses on . . . satisfying 
individual preferences.”), with Shiffrin, supra note 145, at 228-29 (starting from the position that 
“[t]he institution of contract is a social creation through which we, the community, provide support 
to one another’s agreements to facilitate them and to create greater security in them,” and 
extrapolating that the community should “evaluate whether it will assist endeavors . . . that are 
significantly exploitative or immoral” (footnote omitted)).  
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Finally, this is not to say that unconscionability must be motivated by 
economic efficiency. Rather, unconscionability need not choose between 
normative meanings; just as tort law has both an economic and a rights-based 
normative meaning,149 so too may unconscionability.  
III. UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A COHERENT CONCEPT 
The new unconscionability doctrine takes into account the major law and 
economics critiques: consumers’ inability to appropriately price the terms of 
contracts and collective action problems associated with certain types of 
provisions. The harm created by these contracts drives the normative 
meaning of unconscionability. The jural meaning has only very recently 
developed in the case law. As previously discussed, I argue it can be distilled 
down to the following: when the offeror has reason to believe that a reasonable 
person in the offeree’s position would not know the meaning of the terms in the 
contract, the offeror cannot impose on the offeree terms either that a reasonable person 
would not expect, or that, even if expected, would impose costs on third parties 
similarly situated to the offeree. 
By looking to the knowledge of the meaning of the terms in a contract, 
courts refuse to enforce contracts that would not be accurately priced on the 
market. And by refusing to recognize class action waivers and confidentiality 
provisions for arbitration clauses, courts account for collective action 
problems unreachable by unrestrained market forces.  
“Know the meaning of the terms in the contract” refers to both 1) terms in 
“legalese” that a reasonable consumer would not understand if she read them; 
and 2) terms that a reasonable consumer would not read because it would not 
be economically rational to do so. Courts often speak of whether a contract was 
“understandable,” and this Comment argues that this analysis can, and should, 
include an analysis of both these elements. This Comment will use 
“understandability” in this expansive sense: a contract that is too long is not 
understandable in today’s world even if its terminology is simple.  
The emphasis on consumer knowledge, understandability, and 
expectations as an integral part of the unconscionability analysis is new. For 
example, a Westlaw search of all state and federal cases before 1980 reveals 
just fifteen that mention unconscionability, understanding, and 
expectations.150 These terms are commonplace today as part of an analysis of 
 
149 See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.  
150 Search Results, WESTLAW NEXT, http://next.westlaw.com (search “advanced: 
(unconscionability, & understand, & expectation) & DA(bef 01-01-1980)”) (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
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unconscionability: the same search of cases reveals that, between 2000 and 
2014 alone, there were 526 cases.151  
A. Emphasis on Whether the Contract Was Understandable 
Courts increasingly look at whether the contract was understandable, 
rather than understood, as part of the procedural unconscionability analysis. 
By ensuring a contract is understandable, they ensure that at least some 
consumers are likely to actually understand it. Because the market can 
function effectively (such that exchanges will increase societal welfare) as 
long as there exist some number of knowledgeable consumers—
indistinguishable to sellers from the ignorant consumers—to pressure the 
market, this emphasis reinforces the norm that free exchanges be  
value-increasing. Under this model, every individual need not understand the 
product she is buying or the contract she is signing for those products and 
contracts to be efficiently priced.  
This standard is more likely to result in a consumer-friendly decision than 
the old doctrine based on reasonable expectations, which found that a contract 
is to be interpreted in accordance with the expectations of a 
misunderstanding party only where the other party is aware of the 
misunderstanding.152 That standard required the more knowledgeable party 
to know that the other party did not understand the contract for expectations 
to come into play. The new standard of unconscionability requires merely 
that the knowledgeable party know that a reasonable consumer would not 
understand the contract (in the expansive sense of “understand”) in order to 
consider consumer expectations. It requires no understanding on the part of 
the particular consumer at issue, thereby accommodating mass-market 
Internet contracting.  
Courts have long recognized that consumers do not always know or 
understand the contents of contracts. The Supreme Court in 1873 noted the 
typical consumer’s lack of knowledge or understanding of a contract’s 
contents. In analyzing the relationship between a carrier and his customers, 
the Longwood Court stated that the customer “prefers . . . to accept any bill 
of lading, or sign any paper the carrier presents; often, indeed, without 
 
151 Search Results, WESTLAW NEXT, http://next.westlaw.com (search  
“advanced: (unconscionability, & understand, & expectation) & DA(aft 12-31-2000) & DA(bef 12-
31-2014)”) (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
152  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“The manifestation of the parties are operative in accordance with the meaning attached to them 
by one of the parties if that party does not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and 
the other knows the meaning attached by the first party.”).  
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knowing what the one or the other contains.”153 The Court did not discuss 
evidence of the individual cattle drover’s understanding of the contract; 
rather, the Court considered consumers of the services of common carriers 
generally. Similarly, the new shape of the unconscionability doctrine 
recognizes the importance of the typical consumer.  
Today, courts probe this element with increasing frequency. For example, 
the Florida Supreme Court, in holding an agreement unconscionable, noted 
first that the consumers lacked an understanding of the contract written by a 
car dealership,154 and then moved to an objective analysis, explaining that “none 
of the dealership’s employees involved in the deal with the buyers could explain 
arbitration as an alternative dispute remedy in an understandable way.”155 Many 
other courts also look to whether the contract was “understandable by an adult 
of ordinary experience and intelligence”—as the Kentucky Supreme Court 
recently put it156—considering factors such as the amount of time consumers 
were given to read the contract,157 the complexity of the language,158 and what 
opportunity the consumer had to read the contract.159 These cases exemplify 
courts’ emphasis on the understandability of the contract as an objective matter.  
This inquiry can establish certain procedural problems with contracts of 
adhesion; a further analysis guides courts in determining which of a contract’s 
substantive provisions should be unenforceable. In evaluating a contract’s 
substance, many courts apply the “reasonable expectations” test, which 
reflects the unconscionability doctrine’s sensitivity to the market’s ability to 
accurately price contract provisions by giving effect to the contract that the 
market most likely priced through consumer expectations, rather than to the 
actual signed contract.  
For example, Montana honors a consumer’s “objectively reasonable 
expectations . . . even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would 
 
153 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 379 (1873). 
154 Basulto v. Hialeah Auto., 141 So.3d 1145, 1152 (Fla. 2014).  
155 Id. 
156 Energy Home, Div. of S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Peay, 406 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Ky. 2013).  
157  See Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 362 (Utah 1996) (“Factors bearing on procedural 
unconscionability included . . . whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the 
terms and conditions of the agreement . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
158 See, e.g., Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Mo. 2012) (acknowledging 
evidence that the contract in question “was difficult for the average consumer to understand”). 
159  See, e.g., Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 622-23 (Ill. 2006) (finding 
unconscionability where challenged warranty was “unavailable to the consumer until after  
she took delivery”).  
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have negated those expectations.”160 In Mississippi,161 California,162 Missouri,163 
and Washington,164 courts look to the reasonable consumer’s expectations to 
evaluate the substantive unconscionability element. Other courts look at whether 
the provision was “commercially unreasonable”—a feature of many states’ 
unconscionability doctrines that requires a similar analysis.165  
The reasonable expectations doctrine gives meaning to the substantive 
prong of unconscionability analysis. It has allowed courts to invalidate a wide 
variety of provisions, such as limitations on the availability of full recovery by 
the consumer (including practical limitations created by excessive fees or fee-
shifting), selection of a seriously inconvenient forum, and unduly tight 
deadlines for filing claims.166 By looking at what reasonable consumers would 
expect the contract to contain, courts acknowledge that the contract that 
consumers believe they agree to is sometimes not the one they get.  
The importance of consumer expectations has older roots. The 1950 
comment to U.C.C. section 2-302 defined an unconscionable clause as one 
“so one sided as not to be expected.”167 The modern version of the section 
 
160 Fisher ex rel. McCartney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2013 MT 208, ¶ 19, 371 Mont. 147, 
305 P.3d 861, 867 (citation omitted); see also Kelker v. Geneva-Roth Ventures, 2013 MT 62, ¶¶ 18-19, 
369 Mont. 254, 303 P.3d 777 (noting that reasonable expectations analysis is part of a procedural 
unconscionability finding, but that a finding of substantive unconscionability alone can still be 
sufficient). For a discussion of this approach in interpretation of insurance contracts, see generally 
Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970).  
161 See, e.g., Caplin Enters. v. Arrington, 2011-CT-01932-SCT (¶ 13) (Miss. 2014) (“To determine 
whether a contract is substantively unconscionable, we look . . . to the specific terms which violate 
the expectations of, or cause gross disparity between, the contracting parties.” (citation omitted)).  
162  See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 202 (Cal. 2013) (noting that 
unconscionable terms are “provisions that seek to negate the reasonable expectations of the 
nondrafting party”).  
163 See Brewer, 364 S.W.3d at 495 (“It is unlikely that the ramifications of such provisions are 
comprehended by the average consumer or comport with the reasonable expectations of an average 
member of the public.”). 
164 See Brown v. MHN Gov’t Servs., 306 P.3d 948, 954 (Wash. 2013) (“Procedural surprise 
generally relates to whether the challenged term is hidden in a standardized form or beyond the 
reasonable expectations of the weaker party.”). 
165 Lonegrass, supra note 10, at 16; see also, e.g., Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 
250, 267 (Ill. 2006) (“Substantive unconscionability concerns the question whether the terms 
themselves are ‘commercially reasonable.’” (citation omitted)); Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of 
N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 907 (N.M. 2009) (“The substantive analysis focuses on such issues as whether 
the contract terms are commercially reasonable and fair. . . .”); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 
2006 WI 53, ¶ 36, 290 Wis. 2d 514, 714 N.W.2d 155 (“The analysis of substantive unconscionability 
requires looking at the contract terms and determining whether the terms are commercially 
reasonable.” (footnote omitted)). 
166 See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.  
167 Leff, supra note 11, at 498.  
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includes comments explaining that the doctrine seeks “the prevention of 
. . . unfair surprise.”168 
The explanation for using market inefficiency as an indicator of 
unconscionability is a better analysis than claiming that unconscionability is 
entirely subjective. Some scholars argue that this subjective element is in fact 
the unconscionability doctrine’s core jural meaning. 169  And indeed, some 
courts continue to look not at understandability or reasonable expectations 
but at the individual parties’ understandings. 170  But this theory of 
unconscionability’s meaning would fail to explain the vast number of cases in 
which courts enforce contracts without considering whether the contracting 
consumer understood them, upon finding it was understandable.171 A more 
comprehensive explanation is that the unconscionability doctrine holds 
procedurally unconscionable not contracts that were misunderstood or not 
understood at all, but rather contracts that were not understandable to a 
reasonable consumer and imposed unexpected conditions. By doing so, 
unconscionability counteracts market inefficiencies.  
B. Preventing Collective Action Problems 
In a growing number of states, the unconscionability doctrine has been 
used to hold unenforceable contract provisions that present collective action 
problems. At least two types of clauses in contracts of adhesion present these 
 
168 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014) (citation omitted).  
169  See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 1, at 184 (“By proper alignment of adhesion and 
unconscionability, we can avoid over breadth in our characterization of assent and bargaining as 
objective in nature.”).  
170 See, e.g., Gladden v. Boykin, 739 S.E.2d 882, 884-85 (S.C. 2013) (holding a limited liability 
clause in home inspection contract enforceable, and noting that “a self-employed home inspector 
operating out of his home had no significantly greater bargaining power or cognizably more 
sophistication than a trained though not practicing real estate agent, and there is no allegation that [the 
plaintiff] lacks the education to understand the terms of a contract or protect her own interests”).  
171 See, e.g., Energy Home, Div. of S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Peay, 406 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Ky. 
2013) (finding provision in manufactured home purchase contract was not procedurally 
unconscionable because “the arbitration requirements are stated in clear and concise language; it is 
not hidden or obscured” and “the agreement clearly explains” arbitration); Fisher ex rel. McCartney 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2013 MT 208, ¶ 23, 371 Mont. 147, 305 P.3d 861 (enforcing family-
member exclusion in auto insurance contract because “[a] person of average intelligence would be able 
to determine” that the policy had these exclusions “by a review of these provisions of the Policy”); 
Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 93 A.3d 760, 763-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (holding 
enforceable a six-month statute of limitations in an employment form contract even though the 
Spanish-speaking employee did not understand it in part because “the provision was clear in its terms, 
[and] was conspicuously placed in the application form”).  
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problems: confidentiality requirements respecting the outcome of arbitration 
and class action waivers.  
1. Confidentiality Requirements 
Confidentiality requirements respecting arbitration outcomes create 
collective action problems because individuals are only marginally affected 
and thus have relatively little incentive to bargain with a business to eliminate 
them; after all, that consumer will know the result of her arbitration, 
notwithstanding the confidentiality clause. However, in aggregate, such 
clauses deprive consumers of the ability to evaluate whether arbitrators are 
deciding cases fairly or consistently. Therefore, a system in which every 
individual pays a few cents more for a contract that does not contain a 
confidential arbitration provision and affords consumers the ability to 
evaluate arbitrators is likely optimal (“Option A”). On the contrary, the 
current situation, favoring freedom of contract, shepherds consumers into 
choosing a slightly cheaper contract that keeps the results confidential 
(“Option B”) because they cannot be assured others will choose to eliminate 
such clauses, and so will reap no reward from putting the cost and effort into 
eliminating such clauses from their own contracts. Thus, an exclusive focus 
on the rights of the parties before the court, without regard to the way the 
contract provisions affect social welfare as a whole, is detrimental.  
Although some courts refuse to look beyond the parties, taking seriously 
their traditional common law role of resolving discrete disputes rather than 
determining the best social practices,172 many other courts are beginning to 
invalidate confidentiality provisions in contracts of adhesion, acknowledging 
the impact those provisions have on both the parties and nonparties to the 
contract. For example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held unenforceable a 
term in a contract of adhesion requiring confidentiality respecting the 
outcome of the mandatory arbitration.173 The court recognized that secrecy 
would prevent adequate evaluation of the fairness of the arbitrator and would 
preclude the gathering of necessary evidence for building a case of 
misconduct. 174  As the plaintiff argued, “as a repeat participant in the 
arbitration proceedings, the company is able to gather a body of information 
 
172 See, e.g., Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 280 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Each 
side has the same rights and restraints under those provisions and there is nothing inherent in 
confidentiality itself that favors or burdens one party vis-a-vis the other in the dispute resolution 
process. Importantly, the confidentiality of the proceedings will not impede or burden in any way 
[plaintiff ’s] ability to obtain any relief to which she may be entitled.”). 
173 Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 579 (Ky. 2012).  
174 Id. at 578-79.  
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relating to precedent and rulings arising from within the dispute resolution 
process, to which customers involved in separate proceedings would have no 
access.”175 Other jurisdictions have similarly recognized that confidentiality 
agreements, though applied to both parties equally, advantage the repeat 
player.176 Courts thus often expressly look to the impact such provisions have 
on the arbitration system. 
2. Class Action Waivers 
The second collective action problem created by contracts of adhesion 
involves class action waivers. These present a collective action problem because 
an individual consumer obtains no value out of the right to participate in a 
class action suit unless other consumers also have that right. Therefore, a 
consumer will not pay a higher price for a contract that allows such suits if she 
does not have reason to believe that other consumers are doing the same. In 
other words, consumers must insist on the absence of such waivers as a group 
for the absence of the waivers to be valuable. 
In many states, the unconscionability doctrine invalidates class action 
waivers.177 But states’ movement in this direction was upset in 2011 when the 
 
175 Id. at 578.  
176  See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding confidentiality 
agreement unconscionable because it gave repeat players advantages that could not be mitigated); 
Sprague v. Household Int’l, 473 F. Supp. 2d 966, 975 (W.D. Mo. 2005) (holding confidentiality 
agreement unconscionable because it benefited the repeat player defendant); Torrance v. Aames 
Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 875 (D. Or. 2002) (holding a confidentiality provision 
unconscionable and expressing concern over such provisions); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 
236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (“The advantages repeat participants possess over 
‘one time’ participants in arbitration proceedings are widely recognized in legal literature and by 
federal courts.”); Acorn v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“By 
keeping all awards confidential, any advantages that inure to Defendants as repeat participants are 
effectively concealed, thereby preventing the scrutiny critical to mitigating those advantages . . . . 
[I]f consumers obtain determinations that a particular . . . practice is unlawful, they are prohibited 
from alerting other consumers.”); Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 764 (Wash. 2004) 
(“[R]epeat arbitration participants enjoy advantages over one-time participants and 
. . . confidentiality provision[s] magnif[y] the effect of those advantages.”). But see Kilgore v. 
KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2013) (declining to find the confidentiality 
provision in an arbitration clause unconscionable because of a lack of procedural unconscionability); 
Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004) (“While the 
confidentiality requirement is probably more favorable to the cellular provider than to its customer, 
the plaintiffs have not persuaded us that the requirement is so offensive as to be invalid.”).  
177 See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Circuit City, 
through its bar on class-wide arbitration, seeks to insulate itself from class proceedings while 
conferring no corresponding benefit to its employees in return. This one-sided 
provision . . . operates solely to the advantage of Circuit City.”); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002) (“The clause is not only harsh and unfair to Discover customers 
who might be owed a relatively small sum of money, but it also serves as a disincentive for Discover 
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Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion held that an arbitration 
agreement that did not provide for class-wide arbitration was enforceable, 
overturning the California Supreme Court’s holding that the effective waiver of 
the plaintiff ’s right to a class action was unconscionable.178 The Court explained 
that the rule the California court applied was preempted by the Federal 
Arbitration Act, noting that California courts had “frequently applied this rule 
to find arbitration agreements unconscionable.” 179  It is unclear whether 
Concepcion bars states from finding that class action waivers are unconscionable, 
particularly in light of Justice Thomas’s concurrence, providing the majority 
with its fifth vote. Justice Thomas argued that common law defenses to contracts 
that “relate[] to the making of an agreement” would not violate the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).180 His language convinced at least some state courts that 
unconscionability was still a viable defense against class action waivers, as long as 
that defense was not used “in a way that would hold otherwise valid arbitration 
agreements unenforceable for the sole reason that they bar class relief.”181 
The Missouri Supreme Court explained in Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans 
that “[n]ot all state law contract defenses require class wide arbitration to the 
detriment of both the defendant and the plaintiff consumer.”182 Rather, some 
contracts might provide arbitration terms that are more favorable than class 
arbitration.183  Explaining that California’s rule in Concepcion disfavored 
arbitration by analyzing unconscionability as though it were an arm of the 
state’s public policy and not an independent common law concept, the court 
contrasted Concepcion’s interpretation of California’s rule with the Missouri 
doctrine of unconscionability. 184 The court, in a nod to Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence, explained that “unconscionability is linked inextricably with the 
process of contract formation because it is at formation that a party is required 
 
to avoid the type of conduct that might lead to class action litigation in the first place.”); Kinkel v. 
Cingular Wireless, LLC, 828 N.E.2d 812, 821 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding class action waiver was 
unconscionable because it could limit access to court and was one-sided in its application); Fiser v. 
Dell Comput. Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. 2008) (concluding that class action waiver is contrary 
to public policy); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 278-79 (W. Va. 2002) (finding a 
class action waiver unconscionable because it allowed wrongdoers “to go unpunished, undeterred, 
and unaccountable”); see also J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1752-53 n.87 (2006) (listing additional 
cases that have invalidated class action waivers). 
178 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
179 Id. at 1746 (citation omitted).  
180 Id. at 1755 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
181 Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Mo. 2012). 
182 Id. at 490.  
183 Id. at 489.  
184 Id. at 491.  
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to agree to the objectively unreasonable terms.”185 The court went on to apply 
the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate the provision in a contract that 
precluded class action litigation because the contract was adhesive, and 
because the inability to pursue the action as a class effectively barred the 
plaintiff from bringing his claim entirely.186  
As if to bolster the Missouri Supreme Court’s statement that it was not 
invalidating contract provisions on the mere existence of a class action waiver, 
the court issued another opinion on the same day as Brewer, reversing a lower 
court decision finding a class action waiver unenforceable per se on the 
grounds of unconscionability and remanding the case for consideration of the 
enforceability of the agreement based on “ordinary state-law principles that 
govern contracts,” in light of Concepcion. 187  The highest court in 
Massachusetts similarly applied the unconscionability doctrine, in spite of the 
holding in Concepcion.188  
The number of cases considering Concepcion are isolated, however, because 
the Supreme Court quickly returned to the subject when it further extended 
the reach of Concepcion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.189 
In that case, the court held that an arbitration clause is still enforceable under 
the FAA even if the loss of the right to participate in a class action would 
practically preclude a plaintiff from bringing a suit—the reason used in both 
Brewer and Feeney. 190  In light of American Express, Massachusetts has 
retreated from its pro-class action holding in Feeney.191 It is still unclear how 
the Missouri Supreme Court will respond to American Express with respect 
to class action waivers in arbitration agreements. It is possible that the 
Missouri courts could continue to apply the unconscionability doctrine to 
invalidate class action waivers found in adhesive contracts by emphasizing 
procedural, rather than substantive, unconscionability. 192  However, such 
arguments would be difficult to reconcile with the line drawn by American 
 
185 Id. at 493.  
186 Id. at 493-96.  
187 Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 517-18 (Mo. 2012).  
188 See Feeney v. Dell Inc., 989 N.E.2d 439, 441 (Mass. 2013) (finding a class action waiver may 
be unconscionable, despite Concepcion, by making claims effectively nonremediable), abrogated by 
Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).  
189 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
190 See id. at 2311 (“[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory 
remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”). 
191 See Machado v. System4 LLC, 993 N.E.2d 332, 333 (Mass/ 2013) (acknowledging that 
American Express abrogated Feeney).  
192 See, e.g., Lopez v. H & R Block, Inc., 429 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that 
the trial court erred in finding the class action waiver unconscionable as against public policy, but 
remanding for further factfinding on possible procedural problems with respect to the contract). 
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Express. Other states’ courts have expressed sympathy for the Feeney and 
Brewer holdings, but have held that the ruling in Concepcion precludes the use 
of the unconscionability doctrine in this way.193  
In light of Concepcion and American Express, arguments that class action 
waivers that come as part of arbitration clauses are unenforceable because 
they are inefficient are relegated to the realm of policy for the legislature, 
rather than doctrine for the courts. To reinstate the law as it was before 
Concepcion, under which state courts are free to invalidate arbitration 
provisions barring class action suits using the unconscionability doctrine, 
Congress would have to amend the FAA. Doctrinally, though, 
unconscionability may still mean that certain economic inefficiencies in 
contracts of adhesion are unenforceable; the FAA preempts only provisions 
that relate to limitations on class actions in arbitration provisions.  
The Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence is likely a major factor 
contributing to the coalescence of unconscionability as its own doctrine and 
differentiating it from public policy. By the 1980s, the Court openly espoused the 
benefits of arbitration and interpreted disputes in favor of the policy.194 This 
strengthened the argument that federal law preempted state courts from 
invalidating arbitration provisions on the grounds of public policy.195 But the 
 
193 See, e.g., McKenzie Check Advance of Fla. v. Betts, 112 So.3d 1176, 1181-83, 1188 (Fla. 2013) 
(extensively analyzing California unconscionability law and holding Concepcion requires the court to 
enforce a class action waiver, and cannot hold it void under public policy). The Kentucky Supreme 
Court has perhaps more than any other state court expressed its disagreement with Concepcion, but 
has also acknowledged that its hands are tied:  
Because of the important purpose served by class actions, we would be inclined to join the 
jurisdictions . . . that have invalidated provisions of consumer adhesion contracts that bar 
class action resolution of disputes. Our initial opinion in this case so held. However, upon 
application of Concepcion, we are now constrained to conclude that under contracts like the 
one now before us, which contain a class action waiver and also require disputes to be 
arbitrated under the FAA, the federal policy favoring arbitration preempts any state law 
or policy invalidating the class action waiver as unconscionable based solely upon the 
grounds that the dispute involves many de minimis claims which are, individually, unlikely 
to be litigated.  
Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 569 (Ky. 2012). 
194 See Stempel, supra note 32, at 773-75 (showing how, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Court began resolving uncertainties in arbitration clauses in a manner that was favorable to 
arbitration while simultaneously highlighting the social benefits of arbitration); see also, e.g., Moses 
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19-29 (1983) (discussing the strong 
federal policy favoring arbitration when the scope of an agreement was ambiguous).  
195 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 259, 339 (1990) (“Judicial doctrines or methods that fail to give full and fair effect to 
the Arbitration Act on the basis of uncompelling ‘implicit’ readings of a statute, notions of the 
‘better’ outcome, or relative preferences for litigation over arbitration are undesirable and ultimately 
indefensible on jurisprudential if not practical grounds.”). 
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FAA allowed traditional contract defenses to void arbitration provisions. 196 
Because it was less constrained than doctrines like duress or fraud, 
unconscionability was one of the only tools available to courts interested in 
limiting the enforceability of arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion.197 
Thus courts saw even more reason to shape unconscionability into a traditional 
contract doctrine. Indeed, many state courts continue to manifest their resistance 
to mandatory arbitration agreements, though they do so covertly, often using 
facially neutral doctrines like unconscionability. 198  For example, in Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, upon reconsideration in light of Concepcion and 
American Express, the court left California’s unconscionability rule unchanged.199 
Recognizing the danger of harming third parties through contracts of 
adhesion is integrally connected to the mass use of the contracts. While in an 
individually negotiated contract it would be possible for individuals to barter 
away their rights to disclose the results of arbitration, or to waive the right to 
participate in a class action, these tradeoffs take on particular significance 
when they occur in mass-produced contracts of adhesion.  
Accounting for these two components—a reasonable person’s lack of 
knowledge of the terms or an effect on third parties—unconscionability 
fulfills a main element necessary to be a legal concept: it serves as a rational 
normative basis for a decision. The normative meaning of unconscionability 
is that procedural features and substantive contents that are inefficient from 
a market perspective are unenforceable. This meaning applies an economic 
analysis to determine whether the contract is one that would likely be priced 
accurately on the market, and therefore create value-enhancing exchanges, or 
whether it is one that creates collective action problems or otherwise 
precludes a maximally efficient outcome.  
This examination of recent case law presents a possible jural description 
of unconscionability that pairs with its normative meaning. It shows that 
unconscionability means that when the offeror has reason to believe that a 
reasonable person in the shoes of the offeree would not know the meaning of 
the terms in the contract, the offeror cannot impose on the offeree terms 
 
196 See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.  
197  See Stempel, supra note 32, at 792 (“Against this backdrop [of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence], it is perhaps unsurprising that lower courts have to a degree rediscovered 
unconscionability analysis as one of the relatively few grounds remaining available for the policing 
of arbitration agreements.”).  
198 See Broome, supra note 36, at 44 (studying California Courts of Appeal and concluding that 
“unconscionability challenges succeed more frequently when the contractual provision at issue is an 
arbitration agreement”); Knapp, supra note 36, at 622-23 (finding that unconscionability claims were 
increasingly successful nationally between 1990 and 2008).  
199 311 P.3d 184, 205-11 (Cal. 2013). 
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either that a reasonable person would not expect, or that, even if expected, 
would impose costs on third parties similarly situated to the offeree.  
C. The Incipience of the Concept 
The explanation put forth here for unconscionability is in part descriptive 
and in part prescriptive. It is descriptive in the way it draws on current trends, 
but it is prescriptive in that it does not represent current trends perfectly; 
rather, it seeks to shape the common law to become more coherent with 
respect to this concept.  
The description above of the concept of unconscionability could be said to 
be underexplanatory in that it fails to describe many of the ways in which courts 
use the concept of unconscionability. For example, courts continue to apply the 
unconscionability doctrine to refuse to enforce extremely high interest rates, 
even when consumers are well aware of them when signing.200 These cases do 
not fit within the jural meaning offered here; these terms are often 
understandable—the exorbitant interest rate may be clearly written, right on 
the front page, and discussed with the consumer—and they do not inflict harms 
on third parties. Intervention is not necessary under an efficiency-based 
market-analysis, because these contracts could be priced appropriately by the 
market on its own, given that consumers know the terms they are agreeing to.  
Although to some these kinds of cases are the hallmark of 
unconscionability analysis because they enable the unconscionability doctrine 
to be the “law of the poor,”201 they are too different from the problems that 
Llewellyn revived unconscionability in order to address—contracts of 
adhesion. They are better handled by public policy, the old catch-all notion 
that allows a court to step in until the legislature intervenes. And, to varying 
degrees, legislatures have taken on the regulation of high interest rates.202  
And indeed, there is likely no way to describe unconscionability as a 
concept in a way that embraces all those decisions in which it is currently 
used, and only those. To do this would be to allow the concept to dissolve into 
a collection of factual scenarios without classification. To classify is, 
inevitably, to cut off. It requires drawing a line and excluding certain features 
 
200 See, e.g., Kelker v. Geneva-Roth Ventures, 2013 MT 62, ¶¶ 4, 37-38, 369 Mont. 254, 303 
P.3d 777 (holding unconscionable a loan with an interest rate of 780%); State ex rel. King v. B & B 
Inv. Grp., Inc., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 45, 329 P.3d 658 (N.M. 2014) (holding unconscionable a loan 
with an interest rate of over 1000%).  
201 See generally Fleming, supra note 34.  
202 Every state legislature has set maximum interest rates, typically between six and ten 
percent. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect 
on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 526 (2004). But these laws also have 
exceptions depending on the type of lender or the form of the loan. Id. at 527-28.  
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that connect in some ways, but not the “right” ways, with the other members 
of the class.203 The hope is merely to describe a workable meaning of the 
concept that conforms in many ways with its current use, but also provides a 
rational basis for encircling and judging similarly. It does fail to match 
perfectly with current use; however, it succeeds in describing enough of its 
use to consider it a description of the concept’s core.  
The definition of the concept as oriented toward market-efficiency could 
also be said to be overinclusive, in that it would require courts to invalidate 
provisions they currently uphold. For example, David Gilo and Ariel Porat argue 
that courts focus too much on traditional oppressive techniques, such as hiding 
provisions in adhesive contracts, but too little on selectively oppressive terms, 
selectively beneficial terms, or especially complex contracts.204 These types of 
contracts, they argue, involve market inefficiencies because they differentiate 
between knowledgeable consumers and others, or because they increase the 
information gap between consumers and businesses.205 Although thus far courts 
have not focused on the danger these types of provisions pose, courts could 
address them using the jural meaning of unconscionabiltiy offered here: 
consumers could be found to not understand the terms of especially complex 
contracts, and terms that selectively benefit or harm specific groups could be 
shown to harm third parties by obscuring the cost of the contract. However, 
courts do not appear to have applied the doctrine to these types of provisions.206 
In addition to empirical results that fail to fit perfectly within the bounds 
of the doctrine offered here, courts do not always define the concept of 
unconscionability as this Comment does. Some states still reference and apply 
the traditional meaning of the concept as being one that “shocks the 
conscience.”207 For example, although one New Jersey court applied a relatively 
modern version of the unconscionability doctrine, it still used language 
referring to the doctrine’s origins: “A party raising a claim of unconscionability 
has the burden of showing some over-reaching or imposition resulting from a 
bargaining disparity between the parties, or such patent unfairness in the terms 
of the contract that no reasonable [person] not acting under compulsion or out 
 
203 See Schauer, supra note 21, at 535-38 (explaining that an essential attribute of rules is that 
they generalize, and therefore must sometimes treat members of the class inappropriately if the rules 
are to be independent of the reasons for action in any particular case).  
204 See generally Gilo & Porat, supra note 31, at 143-61. 
205 See id. at 194 (“Ironically, courts’ attention is much more needed with respect to the other 
three techniques, which courts currently ignore, because these techniques are expected to survive 
even fierce competition among suppliers.”).  
206 See id. 
207 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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of necessity would accept them.”208 But other courts hesitently recognize a 
change and are reluctant to apply the “shocks the conscience” standard.209 Still, 
other courts mention the old standard, but go on to discuss and apply more 
contemporary doctrinal elements as well.210 The concept’s jural meaning is 
incipient and will likely take time to become explicit in courts’ language.  
As an analysis of case law shows, objections of fit are also accurate from a 
linguistic perspective. And, as Gilo and Porat’s work shows, both the 
underexplanatory and overinclusive objections are accurate as an empirical 
matter. There are many instances that do not fit the mold. Thus, this Comment 
is not just an effort to describe what is occuring, but an effort to identify a core 
meaning in the cases. It is certainly true that courts would need to do more to 
adhere to the unconscionability doctrine in a consistent way.  
D. The Concept’s Jural Meaning and Formalist Concerns 
Legal scholars acknowledges the availability of unconsionability to 
address the problems associated with contracts of adhesion, but there is little 
agreement or understanding about how to effectively employ it. Unlike many 
common law concepts that generate broad agreement on their jural meaning 
but have disagreement on the norms that drive them,211 unconscionability has 
done the opposite: while many agree on the norms deriving from the law and 
economics literature, they disagree on the corresponding jural meaning. In 
other words, scholars and courts disagree on when and how to apply the 
doctrine in a coherent way.  
Although the jural meaning discussed here is not a formalist one, the 
division between normative and jural meaning is not entirely inconsistent with 
formalist views.212 Ernest Weinrib argues that for a formalist concept, the 
“doctrinal and institutional elements can . . . be understood as the 
 
208 Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 93 A.3d 760, 766 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) 
(citation omitted). 
209 See, e.g., State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 32, 329 P.3d 658 (N.M. 
2014) (stating that the test for substantive unconscionability asks whether the contract term “is grossly 
unreasonable and against our public policy under the circumstances” (citation omitted)). 
210  See, e.g., Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 285-86 (Tenn. 2004) (mentioning that 
unconscionability is found where terms “shock the judgment of a person with common sense” and 
going on to state “that enforceability of contracts of adhesion generally depends upon whether the 
terms of the contract are beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person”).  
211 See Balganesh & Parchmovsky, supra note 23, at 1248 (explaining that an essential feature of 
the common law is the flexibility created by the possibility that a concept with a single jural meaning 
might have multiple normative meanings motivating it).  
212 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of the Law, 97 YALE L.J. 
949, 968 (1988) (“If an initially identified feature is to serve as a fixed point of legal understanding, 
it must participate in the unity that renders a legal relationship intelligible as what it is.”).  
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articulations of a coherent justificatory structure of bipolar interaction.”213 The 
structure must “render[] intelligible the relationships to which it applies.”214 
For example, loss spreading is not a doctrine in the formalist sense, because 
“the appropriate institutional setting for loss spreading is not the bipolarity of 
litigation, but a general scheme of social insurance or taxation that would spread 
accidental loss as thinly and broadly as possible.”215  Loss spreading is not 
coherent because it cannot be fully applied through adjudication. It is therefore 
contrary to the integrity of law.216 Thus, under the formalist understanding, loss 
spreading is not a legal concept; rather, the duty of care is the legal concept.  
The Formalist would object that the problems with contracts of adhesion 
are not conducive to common law resolution because they are not resolved by 
looking to the rights and obligations of parties to a particular contract in an 
individual dispute, but rather demand consideration of third party needs. 
Because the jural meaning offered here requires courts to look to the 
possibility that third parties’ rights might be harmed by the contract before 
the court, Formalists (and others) might argue that the most appropriate 
institutional setting to address the problem of market-inefficient contracts is 
not the “bipolarity of litigation,” but rather the legislature.217  
Ronald Dworkin presents a similar, though more moderate, argument 
distinguishing policy- and principle-based reasoning. While arguments based 
on policy “justify a political decision by showing that the decision advances 
or protects some collective goal of the community as a whole,” arguments 
based on principle “justify a political decision by showing that the decision 
respects or secures some individual or group right.”218 He argues that judges 
should rely on principle rather than policy because doing so respects the 
democratic process by constraining unelected judges. He also believes that 
doing so avoids applying a right retroactively, thereby punishing someone for 
failing to perform an obligation of which he was unaware. 219  Dworkin’s 
argument is more expansive than Weinrib’s—for example, Dworkin accounts for 
 
213 Id. at 969. 
214 Id.  
215 Id. at 971.  
216 Id.; see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 83-84 (1977) (calling a 
court’s reasoning in tort based on “a right to recovery” a “matter of principle,” and based on “whether 
it would be economically wise to distribute liability for accidents in the way the plaintiff suggested 
. . . a matter of policy”).  
217 Cf. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law 
Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 353-57 (1970) (pointing out the expense, time, and protracted 
litigation involved in the judicial approach to consumer protection in form contracts inherent in the 
common law tradition of adapting law case-by-case, and advocating for a legislative solution).  
218 DWORKIN, supra note 216, at 82. 
219 Id. at 84-86.  
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public, as well as private, law, and thus acknowledges that statutory rights may 
provide reasons in an appropriate legal sense, in addition to the common law.  
The view offered here can be compatible with Formalism. While the 
advantages and disadvantages of contracts of adhesion cannot be seen within 
the context of individual disputes that have already come to the point of 
litigation,220 the jural meaning here narrows the focus to the parties before 
the court while addressing normative concerns that reach society as a whole. 
Once unconscionability becomes conceptual, and therefore rule-based rather 
than entirely normative, judicial decisions are based on the principle derived 
from the jural meaning.221 This is entirely consistent with the analytic and 
normative meanings in many other legal concepts, such as the duty of care in 
tort law. There, too, the loss spreading norm would not be conducive to 
common law adjudication, but the jural meaning of duty of care more closely 
conforms to the formalist definitions of a concept.222  
Offering a jural meaning of a concept orients the judge toward principled 
reasons rather than policy reasons. The jural meaning provides the rule-like 
basis for a judge’s decision. By differentiating it from the normative meaning, 
the jural meaning offers an approach to the common law that assuages some 
of the Formalists’ fears about incoherence, unpredictability, and retroactivity.  
Disagreement over the jural meaning of unconscionability is especially 
pronounced because unconscionability challenges some of the foundational 
ideas in contract law. As Jeremy Waldron argues, concepts in common law are 
important not just because they allow consistent application of rules, but also 
because they allow the interconnectedness of the law to become apparent.223 
Legal rules are not simply about providing answers to an “if x then y” question, 
but rather represent “a whole array of pairs of such propositions, addressing 
normative issues of slightly different shape and character.”224 Waldron argues 
that rules, and the concepts they use, are not just “single-issue signposts,”225 but 
 
220 See Baird, supra note 132, at 934 (“Legal academics too often exaggerate the dangers of boilerplate. 
They become completely caught up in a framework in which everything reduces to the rights of A against 
B, a framework that is out of touch with how mass markets work.” (footnote omitted)).  
221 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 216, at 83 (explaining that a law giving a subsidy creates a 
“right to a subsidy [that] no longer depends on any argument of policy because the statute made it 
a matter of principle”).  
222 See Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 23, at 1245 (arguing that the duty of care is 
structured as a legal standard, as opposed to a rule, and that some contend the duty is a means to 
impose liability on the cheapest cost avoider).  
223 Waldron, supra note 28, at 24-26. We need not get into a debate over positivism, as Waldron 
does, to see the importance of systematicity. Indeed, as Waldron himself agrees, systematicity can 
reenter even the Positivist’s picture of law if we view it as normatively desirable, and therefore 
persuasive to the sovereign. Id. at 39-40.  
224 Id. at 24.  
225 Id.  
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rather are “interlocking parts of different shape, each contributing a particular 
functional component to an overall integrated picture.”226 For example, to use 
the term “legal person” in one area of law—say, corporate law—has implications 
for other areas of the law in which personhood is recognized, such as 
international law. 227  The advantage of systematicity is that it allows 
lawmakers—judges and legislatures alike—to see how a new law will affect 
other laws that are already in place.228  
By understanding unconscionability as a coherent concept, we can more 
readily understand—and cabin—the ways it interacts with other fundamental 
concepts in contract law. The two most important concepts in contract law 
with which unconscionability interacts are objective manifestation of assent 
(“OMA”) and the parol evidence rule (“PER”).  
 Unconscionability may cause one to question the age-old doctrine that 
agreement in contract law is established by objective manifestation assent—in 
other words, no subjective agreement is required, and courts will not look into 
the subjective intent of the parties, so long as the act that constituted acceptance 
was undertaken intentionally.229 For example, it is fundamental to OMA that one 
can be bound by one’s assent whether or not one considers the legal consequences 
of one’s actions.230 OMA greatly increases efficiency by relieving parties of the 
burden of proving the other party’s state of mind in routine agreements.231  
The jural meaning presented in this Comment connects with, but does 
not upend, the traditional conception of OMA. The concept of 
unconscionability depends on consideration of whether the offeror has reason 
to believe that a reasonable person in the shoes of the offeree would not 
understand the contract. A finding that procedural unconscionability exists 
means that the consumer’s assent is less robust than in a traditional contract—
what I will call “weak OMA.” By relying on the reasonable person standard, 
and using an expansive view of what it means to understand, 
unconscionability continues in the tradition of OMA, while still allowing 
protections for the consumer in an adhesive contract. This jural 
understanding of unconscionability avoids the threat of caving to a subjective 
 
226 Id. at 25. 
227 Id. at 25-26.  
228 See id. at 25 (“That interconnection may be something of substantial importance for anyone 
proposing to change or repeal any one or more items in the array [of legal concepts] . . . .”).  
229 See generally 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, §§ 3.6–3.7 (discussing the general acceptance of 
OMA and methods of determining whether a party intended to be legally bound by the contract).  
230 See id. § 3.7, at 213 (“The fact that one gives the matter no thought does not impair the 
effectiveness of one’s assent, for there is no requirement that one intend or even understand the 
legal consequences of one’s actions.”). 
231 See id. (“This rule . . . has the salutary effects of generally relieving each party to a dispute of 
the burden of showing the other’s state of mind . . . and of helping to uphold routine agreements.”).  
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requirement for assent—one that might threaten to unwind the OMA, which 
is fundamental to the common law on contracts.  
Unconscionability may also come into tension with the parol evidence rule. 
This rule holds that, if a contract is considered “integrated” or “partially 
integrated,” evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or agreements 
is not admissible to contradict a term of the writing.232 While many courts have 
considered contracts of adhesion to be completely integrated because they 
appear, by their thoroughness, to be intended as a final expression of the terms 
of the agreement,233 the Second Restatement allows the admission of evidence 
of prior negotiations to show that the writing is not intended to be the final 
expression of the terms, and is therefore not integrated.234  
On its face, unconscionability may appear to contradict the PER because 
it allows a court to find that the contract’s terms as they appear in writing are 
not the full expression of the contract, even if the contract otherwise appears 
to be an integrated agreement. Using unconscionability, a court can find that, 
where a contract includes explicit written terms that a reasonable consumer 
would not expect, those terms are void. This is antithetical to the PER, which 
prioritizes the written contract over evidence about what the parties believed 
they were agreeing to, thereby making contract enforcement more efficient.  
However, unconscionability as described here can function with the PER. 
Because the PER, under the Second Restatement view, allows evidence of 
negotiations to show that the writing is not integrated, unconscionability is 
merely a particular application of the PER; it allows that weak OMA 
correspondingly weakens the PER. A showing of weak OMA (i.e., procedural 
unconscionability) operates to show that the contract is unintegrated, and the 
PER correspondingly allows the consumer to introduce evidence of 
reasonable expectations or likely harm to third parties to show what the 
parties “actually” agreed to as part of their prior or contemporary 
“negotiations” (i.e., substantive unconscionability).  
It may be strange to think that the negotiation over a contract of adhesion 
occurs through the parties’ reasonable expectations, not through the parties’ 
actual communications. In typical contracts of adhesion, there are no actual 
 
232 U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2014).  
233 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 7.3, at 227 (“[I]f a writing appears in view of its thoroughness 
and specificity to embody a final agreement on the terms that it contains, the agreement is conclusively to 
be taken as an integrated one with respect to those terms.” (footnote omitted)). 
234 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Where 
the parties reduce an agreement to a writing which in view of its completeness and specificity 
reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is 
established by other evidence that the writing did not constitute a final expression.” (emphasis added)).  
  
2016] Unconscionability as a Coherent Legal Concept 823 
 
communications at all beyond the contract itself. It therefore may seem 
nonsensical to introduce evidence of a party’s reasonable expectations as 
evidence of a kind of negotiation for the purpose of demonstrating that the 
contract was not integrated.  
But unconscionability is actually quite consistent with the idea of 
considering negotiations between the parties to determine the terms in an 
unintegrated contract. By looking at the consumer’s reasonable expectations, 
substantive unconscionability considers whether both parties had reason to 
understand the contract a certain way. In adhesive contracts, both parties would 
have reason to understand that the agreement was not the written terms, but 
rather the terms the consumer might expect the contract to contain. Thus, 
evidence of the parties’ reasonable expectations actually addresses just what 
evidence of contemporary negotiations would get at—what reasonable parties 
would think they were agreeing to in contract in those circumstances.  
So, while unconscionability interacts with both OMA and the PER, it 
does not undermine those concepts. By defining the jural meaning of 
unconscionability, one can see how it fits with the rest of the concepts in the 
common law of contracts as well as the law’s systematicity as a unified web.  
E. Reasonable Expectations and Substantive Fairness 
Incorporating parties’ “reasonable expectations” into the substantive law 
of unconscionability may seem an empty appeal to past practice. But it does 
more—it incorporates an element of substantive fairness by appealing 
directly to extralegal norms and practices.  
Any doctrine that relies on a party’s expectations creates a paradoxical 
feedback loop because a party will expect what a court has done in the past. 
Thus, it may seem that relying on a party’s expectations merely cements the 
law in place; when courts rely on “reasonable expectations” to shape the law, 
they create a kind of self-contained system. What they have said in the past 
becomes a justification, in and of itself, to continue to do it in the future, on 
the basis of parties’ expectations. If this were the law, it might further 
predictability, but it would not necessarily further justice; a court is not 
justified in treating a party unfairly simply because she expected it. More 
must be done to ground a court’s decision. Expectations are only a piece of 
the justification—surely fairness must be a part of a court’s decision too.  
But when courts employ a justification based on “reasonable expectations 
of the parties,” they are doing more than looking to what the law has said in 
the past. They are looking also to societal norms, culture, and practices. After 
all, the way people expect to be treated is not based just on what the law 
allows and what it punishes. It is based on norms and cues, cultural narratives, 
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and shared practice. The law draws on all these sources of information to 
determine what is owed to a party who happens to be before the court now 
but was, when conducting the activity at issue, acting within the ambit of all 
these other social, cultural, and shared expectations. Law governing the 
Fourth Amendment has considered “reasonable expectations” this way. As 
the Supreme Court recognized in that context,  
[I]t would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations 
of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in 
criminal cases. Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of 
the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.235  
Incorporating parties’ expectations in this way directly pulls cultural norms 
into the common law. Rather than create a circular and self-justifying system, 
using “reasonable expectations” allows courts to look to extralegal sources of 
norms to make decisions.  
For this reason, incorporating parties’ reasonable expectations into the 
doctrine of unconscionability would be unlikely to result in vastly unfair 
contract law, though this is an empirical matter based on what consumers 
think they are agreeing to in form contracts. However, it would likely not give 
all the benefits back to consumers, either, because certainly there are some 
limitations—such as limitations on the forum so that it is convenient to the 
business, or moderate limitations on the time to file a claim—which a 
consumer may reasonably expect in a contract. Nevertheless, while it is 
difficult to say without polls and data,236 consumers are not likely to expect 
to be required to pay the defendant’s litigation costs, to be required to file in 
a distant forum, or to have only a few weeks to bring a claim. In these areas, 
relying on the notion of reasonable expectations would likely help consumers.  
CONCLUSION 
Unconscionability’s progress toward conceptual coherence would have 
many benefits: it would make courts’ judgments more predictable, make the 
law more stable, and be consistent with the systematicity of the law. But, as 
 
235 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978).  
236  Some have started studying these questions. For example, professors at St. John’s 
University School of Law recently looked at consumers’ awareness and understanding of arbitration 
clauses in contracts of adhesion. See Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts” With Unexpected 
Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements (St. 
John’s Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 14-0009, Feb. 19 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2516432 
[http://perma.cc/3TBK-DGKN]. They found that less than nine percent of consumers realized both 
that a contract presented to them contained an arbitration clause and that the clause would prevent 
consumers from proceeding in court. Id. at 105 fig.7. 
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Frederick Schauer articulated, the benefits of concepts are not without 
sacrifices. By unifying certain factual scenarios, concepts necessarily exclude 
others. This means unconscionability would not be a ready tool for some of 
the purposes for which it is used currently.237 Still, the overall benefit of 
predictability is worth this cost, especially since courts use of public policy 
can pick up where unconscionability left off.  
The Third Restatement of Contracts will specifically address contracts of 
adhesion (which it calls “consumer-to-business contracts”) and will likely 
need to grapple with the conceptual framework of unconscionability. 238 
Interestingly, this is an example of the fracturing of the law that Morton 
Horwitz predicted: he described transsubstantive concepts—concepts that 
reached across fields of law that had previously been “conceived of as a series 
of special cases and particular rules”—as the beginning of the end for 
systematization of the common law.239 He thought that by reaching across 
substantive domains, the common law sowed the seeds of its own destruction 
because it brought up contradictions in different substantive areas of law.240 
The Third Restatement may create a new subdivision in contract law between 
consumer-to-business and business-to-business contracts. It will use a 
substantive division to avoid losing the systematicity of law threatened by the 
potential for conflict between unconscionability and other legal concepts in 
contract law. By drawing a substantive line, it therefore may avoid the 
problem Horwitz identified when concepts and rules become too broad.  
This Comment takes a different approach. Rather than drawing a 
substantive line between contracts of adhesion and all other contracts, this 
Comment puts forth a way to define unconscionability such that the concept 
is consistent with other common law concepts. In this way, it is consistent 
with the formalist transsubstantive agenda. 
A coherent concept of unconscionability is developing. It rests on a 
normative meaning consistent with the law and economics scholarship, and 
employes a jural meaning that looks to reasonable consumers’ expectations 
and harm to third parties. It is a concept that does not twist data in 
conformity with its category, as Llewellyn feared,241 but rather operates with 
an eye toward its practical effects. 
 
237 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.  
238 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
239 HOROWITZ, supra note 19, at 14.  
240 Id. at 14-15. 
241 See Llewellyn, supra note 90, at 453 (arguing that categories and concepts tend “to suggest 
the presence of corresponding data when these data are not in fact present, and to twist any fresh 
observation of data into conformity with the terms of the categories”).  
